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European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
EMCC case studies
Managing large-scale restructuring: Moulinex
Executive summary Restructuring: French context The restructuring process Social and economic measures Results of the social programme Success or failure: Who are the key partners? Annex
This case study is available in electronic format only.
Wyattville Road, Loughlinstown, Dublin 18, Ireland. - Tel: (+353 1) 00 - Fax: 09 / 56 email: email@example.com - website: www.eurofound.eu.int
In 2001, Moulinex employed 10,000 people worldwide, including 4,500 employees in Frances lower Normandy region. Moulinex was a successful company, built up by its founder, Jean Mantelet, whose small household appliance inventions proved hugely popular. International growth in the early 1980s also contributed to Moulinexs growing success. After Mantelets death in 1991, the company continued to grow; however, it also started to accumulate debts and to develop problems with shareholders. In September 2001, Moulinex reached crisis point and filed for bankruptcy; this resulted in its takeover by SEB, Moulinexs French competitor in the household appliance sector. SEB took over four of the nine Moulinex sites in France, a move that resulted in 3,000 redundancies. Following serious social upheavals in autumn 2001 (including strikes, factory sit-ins, and arson threats), the government appointed a representative to oversee the economic and social revitalisation of the lower Normandy region, subsequent to Moulinexs declaration of bankruptcy. What was new about this arrangement was that it combined both economic and social elements. It also took into account the impact of changes on subcontractors. In terms of the social factor, a redundancy agreement was signed by all of Moulinexs trade unions (excluding one). This agreement called for: additional compensation on top of the legally required redundancy package; conversion leave agreements (a six to nine month period during which an employee is compensated and can retrain); and early retirement schemes based on age and also on the number of years of asbestos exposure during the period of time spent working for Moulinex. In relation to economic revitalisation, in 2002, a regional development agreement was signed by the State, by the regional council (which had already helped Moulinex in the past) and by the three French regions Orne, Calvados and Manche. Three years on, 90% of the budget provided has been allocated for site reassignment, support for job creation, and attracting new activities. The redeployment of employees as well as the implementation of the various social measures (e.g. early retirement, retirement based on exposure to asbestos, etc) amounted to 100 million in costs which were entirely paid for by the public authorities. The regional development plan, including site reassignment and the creation of 2,300 new jobs, was funded with 103 million by the state and the lower Normandy region, which financed 40% and 60% respectively. These positive results are attributed to the effective coordination of the various players. However, two criticisms remain: as with many restructuring cases, redundancy marked the beginning of significant social exclusion for a number of former employees (about 20%); former Moulinex employees felt that they were the victims of poor company management.
Restructuring: French context
Since 1997 the year that the Renault plant at Vilvorde was closed public opinion has been relatively negative regarding restructuring and redundancy programmes. The year 2001 was particularly notable in this regard, following Danones European restructuring, which resulted in the closure of two plants at Calais and Ris Orangis, as well as Marks and Spencers decision to close down all of its non-UK stores in Europe. This led to the left-wing French governments implementation of social modernisation legislation legislation that calls for more information and consultation for employees involved in large-scale redundancy programmes or in systematic reindustrialisation activities. Even before
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2005
this law was voted in December 2001, a type of common precedent was introduced in relation to how large firms handle redundancy programmes. This consisted of: a formal period of information and consultation concerning the economic aspects of a plan. Before offering their opinion, employee representatives can ask to be assisted by an external expert. Relatively quickly, trade unions developed close ties with companies that could provide them with such expertise and with accounting experience. Among these firms are Syndex, Secafi-Alpha, Sextant, and DS et O; an information and consultation period regarding the redundancy programme itself. In numerous large firms, this consultation has resulted in negotiation, whereby monitoring committees are set up and the trade unions play a more active role in employee redeployment; creation of redeployment centres or employment hubs with the help of external contractors, who are most often selected on the recommendation of the works committee. Redundant employees may, if they wish, become a member of the redeployment centre. About 50% of the membership rates for these centres are generally supported by the national employment fund; in several cases, when redundancy programmes have had a very strong impact on the region, reindustrialisation and local economic revitalisation efforts are put in place; a reduced reliance on early retirement schemes, even if the largest firms continue to implement early retirement programmes without public funding. In addition, various sectors of the public employment service such as the national employment agency ANPE (Agence nationale pour lemploi), the public employment service training agency AFPA (Association nationale pour la formation professionnelle des adultes) and various ministerial departments often intervene jointly in redeployment and training programmes. Their work, alongside that of outplacement and redeployment firms, is sometimes problematic, however. The various public and private players sometimes have quite different views, and questions arise over issues, such as whether or not people should be encouraged to find another job straight away or whether long-term qualification-based training programmes should be encouraged, when these may not lead to employment. The situation in France is also characterised by the increasing intervention of regional authorities. In the words of one regional contact: Ten years ago, when a company closed, people would demonstrate in front of the prefecture; today, they head for the regional council. This has been attributed to successive waves of decentralisation: in 2003, the cost of economic interventions by the regions came to 2.07 billion (including subsidies, loans, equity investments, development of industrial zones, financial aid for new businesses, etc). More recently, the last decentralisation law by former prime minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin will also allow regional authorities to provide aid for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), funds normally granted by the Ministry of Industry. Today, in conjunction with the interministerial working group on economic change, MIME (Mission interministrielle sur les mutations conomiques), certain French regions have started to put anticipatory measures in place. For example, the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region has set up a 4 million redundancy anticipation fund.
See Bernard Brunhes Consultants, Le rle du SPE dans les restructurations (The role of the Public Employment Service in restructuring), French Ministry of Employment, DGEFP, 2003.
The restructuring process
Company profile In 1937, Jean Mantelet opened his first shop in Alenon in western France, expanding the business that he had originally set up near Paris in 1932. By 1957, the company had grown considerably and took the name Moulinex. In the ensuing years, plants were built in Argentan, Falaise, Cormelles-le-Royal, Mamers and Fresnay-sur-Sarthe all medium-sized towns in Frances rural Orne and Sarthe regions and in the more industrialised region of Calvados. All of these three areas are part of the lower Normandy region. Up until 1974, the company continued to grow and was regarded as a real success story, buoyed by the thriving household appliance sector. The slogan, Moulinex liberates women, highlights the companys popularity amid the sweeping changes that took place in the 1960s the years of Formica and the electric coffee grinders. As Moulinex continued to expand in the lower Normandy region (with the construction of plants at Bayeux and at Granville), additional sites were opened in the US (1977) and in Mexico (1978). Clearly, Moulinex had big plans. By then, the Moulinex group consisted of 10,000 employees. Problems started to emerge, however, in the early 1980s, and in 1986, 1,600 jobs were cut, at a time when many other large-scale restructurings were taking place. By then, Jean Mantelet was 83 years old and had not yet planned for a successor. Nevertheless, new sites were opened in the UK, Italy and Egypt. When Mantelet died in 1991, the CEO and two other directors teamed up to initiate a management buyout involving all employees, a so-called RES (Rachat dEntreprise par ses Salaris), allowing them to find a capital-intensive solution. Subsequently, Moulinex purchased the prestigious German company, Krups, and its four plants in Germany, Ireland, Mexico and Hong Kong. The period between 19941995 marked a particularly difficult time for Moulinex. During this period, the regional council co-signed a loan to Moulinex from the Caisse des Dpts the government body in charge of lending and investing public funds. This highlighted the extent to which local authorities were involved in the company; the president of the regional council, for example, had a seat on the board of Moulinex. In 1995, the management buyout was dissolved following the introduction of the investment fund, EURIS, led by a former cabinet director of the left-wing party, and Minister for the Economy, Jean-Charles Naouri. This also resulted in the appointment of a new CEO, Pierre Blayau, at the request of the investment fund. The companys performance recovery plan (PRP) failed however, and in 2000 the group merged with the Brandt group, while EURIS sold its shares to an Italian group, netting significant capital gains. As a result of these changes, the Italian group El.Fi, which bought out Brandt in 1992, became Moulinexs majority shareholder. In 2000, Moulinex-Krupss sales amounted to 2.66 billion, but the debt created by the merger with Brandt came to 1 billion. In the same year, Patrick Puy from the Legrand group replaced Pierre Blayau as CEO. By spring 2001, increasing debt resulted in the introduction of a new restructuring plan, which required increased share capital in order to finance the plan. In September 2001, the firm filed for bankruptcy and its court-appointed administrators began to seek a buyer. By then, Moulinex had approximately 10,000 employees, while Brandt had 12,000 employees, including 5,000 workers in France. According to the employee representatives interviewed as part of this case study, Moulinexs failure and largescale restructuring were not due to problems in the sector, but to what were referred to as corporate governance problems, and due to shortcomings of its shareholders.
Moulinex in 2001: One of the largest industrial bankruptcies in France On 7 September 2001, the company went into receivership. A number of potential buyers made an offer for Moulinex and for the Brandt factory at Lesquin in Lille. Potential buyers of Moulinex were particularly interested in acquiring ownership of the Krups brand. The final offer which was largely supported by the public authorities was accepted from SEB, Moulinexs long-term rival in the French household appliance sector. SEB purchased nine of the 14 Moulinex plants around the world, and four of the nine plants in France, retaining a total of 1,860 out of 4,500 jobs. This resulted in the closure of five plants in France, a move that led to numerous violent clashes. Workers at Cormelles, for example, threatened to burn down the plant. Clearly, the employees were desperate, and the local authorities supported them in their frustration over the closures, which would have serious consequences for the entire region. The plants affected by the closure were the Cormelles-le-Royal plant near Caen (1,270 employees), Bayeux (434 employees) and Falaise (304 employees), all located in the Calvados region, in addition to the large plant at Alenon (721 employees) in the Orne region. A number of sub-contractors were also affected by the closures, and it is estimated that around 207 jobs were lost in SMEs, as a result. In total, 5,000 jobs were cut all of them in the lower Normandy region. This had devastating social consequences for the region, which the local authorities agreed they could not bear alone. Social consequences nearly 5,000 employees were made redundant; the majority of these workers were women or employees with low educational qualifications, who had worked for a substantial number of years at the plants. Local consequences these were considerable: some 20% of jobs in the sector in the lower Normandy region were lost, the equivalent of 5% of all industrial jobs. Despite its rural and picturesque image, the lower Normandy region also had an industrial side, which it wanted to maintain. In spite of large-scale plant closures, like SNM-USINOR, employment in the industrial sector was relatively healthy in lower Normandy, accounting for 20% of the regions working population (in comparison to 17.7% of the entire working population of France), the equivalent of about 113,000 people. It was also responsible for 26.2% of the regions added value, in comparison to 21.1% for all of France. This was primarily due to the presence of a network of small and medium-sized industries (SMIs), the agri-food business, automotive subcontractors and capital goods in the region (Study by the regional economic and social council, CESR (Conseil conomique et social rgional), 2004). For example, in 2001, taxes acquired from Moulinex accounted for one third of all the professional resources in the town of Alenon. Moulinexs six trade unions were opposed to the move to file for bankruptcy, and even today they argue that the company could have found an alternative solution, allowing it to continue operations; some go so far as to argue that it was a fraudulent bankruptcy. The trade unions were also opposed to the takeover by former company rival, SEB, arguing that it would have a negative impact on employment, both in the short term and long term. Instead, they expressed their preference for a takeover by the Conair-Babyliss group and even fought for a six-month period of observation to be granted by the commercial court. In the end, however, the president of the commercial court chose SEB for the takeover, a decision that was clearly encouraged by the French government. Since Moulinex had declared bankruptcy, the state would have to bear the costs of the redundancy programme; SEB concerned itself only with the employees and plants that it had purchased. Faced with an explosive situation and pressing financial problems (employees September salaries were not guaranteed), the state appointed a representative whose dual mission was to manage employee redeployment and regional economic redevelopment. Therefore, in October 2001, Michel Bove a man with considerable experience in leading restructuring efforts (including the restructuring at Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre, ACH) was named the representative for the economic and social revitalisation of the lower Normandy region, as appointed by the French government.
In a move to resolve ongoing conflicts with employees, an agreement was finally reached with the state, granting additional compensation to employees (over and above the legally required redundancy package), to be calculated based on the length of service. This compensation ranged from 4,574 to 12,196. Other additional measures were also implemented to deal with the social and local consequences of the Moulinex closure, including: the option of conversion agreements for Moulinex employees; reindustrialisation efforts; efforts to reassign sites; financial provision for the economic and social revitalisation of the lower Normandy region. These were in addition to measures guaranteed by law, including redeployment and early retirement and redundancy compensation measures.
Social and economic measures
The unique feature of the measures implemented in October 2001 was that they had both an economic and social dimension a feature that was borne out in original remit entrusted to the representative, Michel Bove. Mr Bove was given 18 months for the redeployment of employees and for the implementation of the various social measures (e.g. early retirement, retirement based on exposure to asbestos, etc). He was also granted a three-year period for the reassignment and economic development of the region. Redundancy programme The redundancy programme was negotiated amid a tense atmosphere, following the appointment of Michel Bove. It was signed in December 2001 by all the trade unions, except CFDT, which completely opposed the new measures and, as far as Moulinex was concerned, was extremely combative, particularly in relation to the Alenon site. The redundancy programme consisted of the following measures: FNE (national employment fund) early retirement provisions; provisions for early retirement for employees who were exposed to asbestos for many years; conversion agreements for nine months; conversion leave for six months; additional redundancy compensation (ranging from 4,574 to 12,196, depending on length of service), under the terms of a 1997 agreement that was forcibly demanded by striking workers who occupied the plants; long-term, qualification-based training programmes for key professions (food industry, hotels and restaurants, public works, health and social professions, etc), as defined by the public employment service training agency, AFPA; setting up of redeployment offices on each site, with specialised contractors (BPI at Alenon; IGS at Cormelles-leRoyal; Lorenzi Conseil at Bayeux; and Right-Garon-Bonvalot at Falaise); strong involvement of the public employment services, ANPE and AFPA, and of departmental labour offices.
Together, all of these redeployment measures amounted to 100 million in costs. Since Moulinex had declared bankruptcy and SEB did not have responsibility for the Moulinex redundancy programme, these costs were entirely paid for by the public authorities. The additional compensation cost of 33 million was financed by the FNE. Site reassignment and economic revitalisation In April 2002, a regional development agreement was signed. This agreement was partly funded by the State, which financed 40% of the actions called for in a series of 80 action items. The remaining 60% was funded by the lower Normandy region and the three areas involved, Calvados, Orne and Sarthe. It was signed by the prefect of the region. A number of actions were called for in the agreement, principally: site reassignment e.g. in Alenon and Cormelle, so that former premises could be transformed to house new companies; reindustrialisation using two contractors who committed themselves to helping in the creation of 2,300 new jobs. These were Sofirem Conseil for Calvados and Geris Consultants for Orne. Sofirem was a conversion company created by Charbonnages de France, and Geris was set up by the Thomson company in the 1980s. The active intervention of the local authorities was essential for the successful implementation of both the site reassignment and reindustrialisation measures. Together, these economic revitalisation measures cost 103 million over three years. The costs of the social and the economic measures were therefore comparable (100 and 103 million, respectively), which suggests a balanced handling of the situation, despite criticisms raised when additional compensation was introduced (many of which were raised by the French employer organisation, MEDEF, whose metallurgy federation threatened to ban UNEDIC from paying salaries when bankruptcy was declared). Alenon town In the case of Alenon, a number of innovative measures can be observed. Throughout Moulinexs presence in the town, local authorities played close attention to Moulinexs development. In 1998, the town decided to partly finance development of a new Moulinex plant in Ecovues, a suburb of Alenon. This plant consisted of a round unit, a factory and a specialised workshop for the plastics industry, one of the major economic sectors of Alenon. Thus, the involvement of local authorities was highly significant. When Moulinex finally declared bankruptcy, the local authorities played an active role in helping the region prepare for the post-Moulinex period. They immediately took economic measures in response to the crisis, as well as playing a key role in the social programme. In the end, the town purchased the Moulinex premises, and then implemented the programme of 1,000 jobs in 1,000 days, also referred to as the Phoenix operation. In addition to its own resources, Alenon spent 26 million of its regional development agreement funds. By October 2004, measures adopted as part of Alenons Phoenix operation had resulted in the: construction of new industrial buildings and reconstruction of an old industrial building (the town purchased the Moulinex factory for one euro); creation of two business parks (Ceris and Aronnay); extensive development of information and communication technologies (ICT); creation of 566 new jobs.
Results of the social programme
Because of the specific circumstances and the different players involved, each of the sites encountered different situations. For the state representative, Michel Bove, strong differences became apparent between the Alenon site and the sites in Calvados (Cormelles, Bayeux, and Falaise). This was largely attributed to the proper functioning in Alenon of teams in charge of employee redeployment and social follow-up. In particular, the efforts of the redeployment office, BPI, together with the high level of involvement of ANPE, AFPA and the Moulinex worker representatives, created a very efficient operation with positive results: out of 1,000 employees at the Alenon site, 94% were redeployed, or found another solution. In Calvados, the situation was less straightforward. The trade unions were particularly critical of measures offered former Moulinex employees, such as the qualification-based training programmes, which were not certain to lead employment, and third-rate jobs with temporary agencies or in the food service industry. In Caen, ANPE appears have remained in the background. In Manche, some 91% of staff were redeployed or found another solution, while Calvados, 78% of staff were redeployed. to to to in
APIMEX the association for the collective interests of Moulinex employees was also critical of the various measures introduced. Even three years after the company declared bankruptcy, the spotlight was placed once again on former employees who were hardest hit by the closures. In October 2004, for example, the first group of employees who were in receipt of ASSEDIC-paid unemployment benefits reached the end of their benefit period, where they were paid 57% of their former salary. They were followed, in February 2005, by the second wave of those who opted for the six-month conversion agreement, and a by third wave of former employees, in June 2005, whose conversion leave expired. As with many restructuring and redundancy programmes, coordinating employment and training approaches was difficult. Certain qualification-based training programmes appeared to have been introduced for no apparent reason, even though they required significant personal investment on the part of the job seekers. Nevertheless, there were some genuine success stories, such as the positive reconversions in the health and social sectors, and the case of the former female Moulinex employees who retrained as drivers for the new tramway in Caen. Besides the training difficulties, another major problem was adjusting to new occupations and salaries. Jobs offered to former Moulinex employees consisted mainly of service jobs in small and medium-sized industries, which were lower paid and which required multiple skills and greater flexibility. After working for a large company, where they had been relatively well protected, employees found it difficult to make this transition.
Results of redeployment Table 1 illustrates the results of the redeployment solutions that were implemented by the various participating organisations, by June 2004: Table 1: Redeployment situation on 30 June 2004
Sites Calvados Manche Orne Lower Normandy Number of employees 1,776 2,880 Solution Social 311 1,131 Job/ Training 420 1,266 TOTAL 1,731 2,397 Without solution Redeployment rate 78% 91% 94% 83%
Source: MIRE, Economic revitalisation mission and ANPE, 30 June 2004
Success or failure: Who are the key partners?
In this particular case, the appointment of a state representative played an important role. In his role as representative, Mr Michael Bove had to work with many of the State authorities: the regional and departmental prefects, the DDTEFP (departmental directors of labour, employment and professional training), the DRIRE (regional industry directors) and the TPG (departmental accounting offices), who alone are entitled to dispense public monies. One of the difficulties of working in a transversal manner with state services is that everyone tends to propose their own solutions. The regional authorities were particularly concerned by the serious consequences of an industrial upheaval, in particular, by the loss of jobs, loss of tax revenues and the negative image portrayed. As a result, the departmental general councillors and the lower Normandy regional council (which had already played a direct economic role in 1995, when its president was a member of Moulinexs board of directors) both intervened. The towns in question Bayeux, Caen, Cormelles, Falaise and Alenon also intervened, sometimes by purchasing sites (Alenon), or by taking part in their renovation (Bayeux). There were many players involved, therefore, many of which were not all on the same side of the political fence. State agencies in charge of employment problems i.e. ANPE, which assists with job search and placement, and AFPA, which is concerned with qualification-based training programmes also played a significant role. Where the training programmes were short and directly connected to a job, other organisations and financing options came into play. Monitoring records, which are regularly issued by the lower Normandy economic revitalisation mission MIRE (Mission interministrielle de revitalisation conomique), bear testament to the role of the range of players involved. After three years, documents assembled for one of the final monitoring meetings (1 July 2004) revealed the following results: jobs retained by SEB: 430 jobs (55 at the research centre in Caen, 292 at the electronic services unit in Saint-L, and 83 in the customer service department in Alenon); jobs lost: 2,729 jobs (721 in Alenon; 1,270 in Cormelles-le-Royal, 304 in Falaise, 434 in Bayeux, and 134 in Saint-L);
four major sub-contracting sites were involved, with 457 jobs (one of these sites is a subsidiary of Moulinex, which manufactures motors; SEB agreed to maintain orders to this plant for three years. This agreement is currently coming to an end, however); a total of 207 jobs are threatened in 38 additional companies; 36% of employees made redundant are on early retirement or other social schemes (declared unfit for work, asbestos exposure, or ACA allocations for older unemployed); 38% have found a job or are currently on long-term, qualification-based training courses; 26% are without a solution; there are more no solution cases in the Calvados region than in Orne. Of the total number of employees who found a solution, 47.2% of these were social solutions and 52.8% were job/training solutions. The regional development and revitalisation agreement was comprised of a series of measures, grouped under five headings: support for finding work; support for new business creation and sub-contractors, and the intervention of conversion companies; reassignment of sites and creation of new zones of activity; attracting new activities; support for the lower Normandy regions three industrial strong points: the plastics and agri-food industries at Caen; universities; and urban reconstruction. Led by the MIRE, these activities were carried out after agreement was reached between the parties involved. The regional development and economic revitalisation process showed the willingness of everyone involved to go beyond merely restoring jobs that were lost as a result of the closure of the four Moulinex sites. This is evident in the fact that the process was accompanied by working groups involved in overseeing the medium-term future of the region. Once the sites were reassigned, following work led by the investment companies, SEB sub-contractors moved into the former Moulinex site at Alenon. At Falaise, two companies in the plastics and cosmetics sectors did the same (creating the potential for 180 jobs over three years). At Cormelles, two companies are in the process of moving into the site and a section of the site will be used for housing. Measures taken regarding former Moulinex sub-contractors are interesting to observe and are relatively innovative, considering that this aspect of restructuring is rarely considered. As a result of measures introduced, sub-contractors benefited from tax moratoria, assistance with commercial canvassing, and loans to enable them to reorganise and restructure. By July 2004, the two conversion companies that had been entrusted with creating as many jobs as had been eliminated (i.e. 3,600 jobs) successfully created 1,977 jobs, the equivalent of 55% of jobs originally planned. Although this is a mixed result, it should be noted that other job creation schemes, funded by other means, took place at the same time. In terms of economic revitalisation, therefore, the final results are significant. As is often the case in restructuring processes, however, former employees did not necessarily benefit from the newly created jobs, either because their skills
did not match, or because they took other paths involving social solutions and unemployment benefits. In cases where large numbers of employees were made redundant, social measures enabling people to retire early played an important role, particularly for employees with many years of service who were extremely bitter about the closure, as they no longer had a say in their fate. Despite some positive results regarding employee redeployment and the redevelopment of the areas in question, there is still a lot of negative feeling regarding the restructuring, even three years after Moulinex declared bankruptcy. This is not because of the actual measures that were implemented, but rather due to the fact that Moulinex was not able to manage the company more efficiently. Although employees and trade unions created APIMEX primarily as a source of support for its employees, they also insist that is was founded to find out the truth. In fact, the trade unions and APIMEX have even filed civil suits against all of Moulinexs former directors. Clearly, three years on, this chapter has not yet been closed. Former Moulinex employees still believe that they were mistreated and that they have not benefited as much as those, for example, in the Lorraine region. Only a more in-depth study can verify this in more detail. Despite these criticisms, the identification of specific objectives, with a state-appointed representative to carry them out, has resulted in a strong coordination of efforts, where work was carried out in a timely manner (within three years) and regional mobilisation was instigated concerning the future. From this perspective, the project has been relatively successful.
Number of Moulinex employees, 30 September 2001
Sites Alenon (Orne) Falaise (Calvados) Cormelles-le-Royal (Calvados) Bayeux (Calvados) Saint-L Paris la Dfense Coffee makers Irons Design office and Customer services Vacuum cleaners Ovens Microwave ovens Deep fryers Food processors Electrical circuits Headquarters Activity Number of employees (of total) 304 1,134 199
Source: MIRE, Economic revitalisation mission, 1 July 2004
Moulinex sub-contractors Four major sub-contractors (+50% of sales)
Sites (Department) Alenon (Orne) Domfront (Orne) Carpiquet (Calvados) Company (activity) SIBER (electronics) DEAL (machinery parts /mechanics) MARBO (electrical cords) CGME Moulinex subsidiary (motor manufacturing) No. of employees 149 193
38 other firms: 1,541 employees (207 jobs lost) List of interviewees
Mr Michel Bove Mr Jean-Louis Jutan Mr Lionel Muller Ms Maggy Lalizel Ms Christine Roimier Ms Bernadette Gautier Mr Gilbert Hyvernat State representative for the lower Normandy economic and social revitalisation mission SYDIS trade union representative CGT trade union representative APICMX Association Mayor of Alenon city General Director of Alenon city Former General Director of AFPA
EF/05/48/EN C 2
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