III. CHARACTERISTICS OF CRISES A central feature of all crises is a sense of urgency, and in many cases urgency becomes the most compelling crisis characteristic. Situations change so dramatically and so rapidly that no one seems to be able to predict the chain of events or the possible outcomes. An
important aspect of such crisis situations is the dynamics that evolve during days, hours, and even minutes. In a revolutionary crisis, such unpredictability, uncertainty, and change characterize the dynamics of the unfolding events. Leaders and decision-makers are often caught by surprises after surprises produced by many forces such as the masses, strength or weaknesses of the regime and the ruling elite, external or internal actors, climatic conditions, and national characters. Surprises characterize the dynamics of crisis situations (Farazmand 1996). Some crises are processes of events leading to a level of criticality or degree of intensity generally out of control. Crises often have past origins, and diagnosing their original sources can help to understand and manage a particular crisis or lead it to alternative state of condition. Crises take many forms and display many patterns, such as defeat in international warfare, revolution, sudden breakdown of unstable democratic regimes, economic disaster, implosion, loss of foreign support resulting in the falling of a dependent regimetemperature changes (Dogan and Higley 1996:9). But, as mentioned above, some crises are sudden and are abrupt events that paralyze a regime, a community, or economic system. Understanding the dynamics of crises helps develop a better understanding of crisis evolution and its management. It requires serious crisis analysis, which in turn needs to go beyond a focus on human error as the origin of the crisis. Organizational, leadership, and systemic deciencies must be diagnosed as effective approaches to crisis management. Many organizations develop over time a culture devoid of ability to detect environmental threats challenging their survival. And many crises develop as a result of managerial and leadership incompetence (Turner 1989 cited in Rosenthal and Kouzmin 1993:6; Perrow 1984). Public organizations are not immune from this maladaptation or bureaucratic culture inicted by many bureau pathological deciencies and vulnerabilities. Crises therefore are destructive, but they may also develop opportunities for a new order, changes that may produce positive results. Therefore, crises create their own antistheses, which may dialectically reinforce and complement forces of positive nature. Key to crisis management is an accurate and timely diagnosis of the criticality of the problems and the dynamics of events that ensue. This requires knowledge, skills, courageous leadership full of risk-taking ability, and vigilance. Successful crisis management also requires motivation, a sense of urgency, commitment, and creative thinking with a long-term strategic vision. In managing crises, established organizational norms, culture, rules, and procedures become major obstacles: administrators and bureaucrats tend to protect themselves by playing a bureaucratic game and hiding behind organizational and legal shelters. A sense of urgency gives way to inertia and organizational sheltering and self-protection by managers and staff alike. This is the most devastating institutional obstacle in the management of any crisis. Successful crisis management requires: (1) sensing the urgency of the matter; (2) thinking creatively and strategically to solving the crisis; (3) taking bold actions and acting courageously and sincerely; (4) breaking away from the self-protective organizational culture by taking risks and actions that may produce optimum solutions in which there would be no signicant losers; and (5) maintaining a continuous presence in the rapidly changing situation with unfolding dramatic events. Reason, creative thinking, and perseverance must lead those involved in crisis management and crisis resolution. Any error or misjudgment can lead to further disasters, causing irreparable damages to human lives. Crisis management or resolution requires strategic thinking of contingencies. Crises also develop opportunities, which must be explored through mobilization of assets and

Dillman and Hailey

character are ambition, integrity, and relatedness. Ambition, Renshon notes, is the domain of initiative and action. The basic concerns in this domain are the capacity, desire, and ability to invest oneself in accomplishing ones purposes (Renshon, 1996, p. 39). Ambition is necessary for achievement and productivity, but too much ambitionor too much inadequately controlledmay result in manipulative, self-serving behavior at the expense of others. If ambition refers to what people do with their lives, integrity refers to how they will do it. Stephen Carter suggests that integrity requires three steps: [1] discerning what is right and what is wrong; [2] acting on what you have discerned, even at personal cost; and [3] saying openly that you are acting on your understanding of right from wrong (Carter, 1996, p. 7). A persona public ofcialof integrity is someone citizens feel they can trust to do right, to play by the rules, to keep commitments (Carter, 1996, p. 7). Integrity is central to the notion of character, not only because of its own fundamental importance, but because of its crucial role in shaping the other two character domains (Renshon, 1996, p. 40). The third element of character concerns ones stance toward relationships with others, which may range from antagonistic to friendly to intimate (Renshon, 1996, p. 45). The character of public ofcials is revealed not so much by what those interpersonal relationships are as by determining why they are what they are. For example, citizens do not want to be manipulated to serve the political or personal ends of public ofcials; rather, they desire respect and sympathy and compassion. Character issues are found in every political system. In the United States in recent years ambition has toppled at least one president and more than one presidential candidate; lack of integrity has led to government regulators ignoring the renaissance of sweated labour (Block, 1996, pp. 19, 2628) and members of Congress using their public ofce for private purposes in a manner that subverts the democratic process (Thompson, 1993, p. 369); and underdeveloped citizen-ofcial relations have denied the public their rightful role in self-governance (Denhardt, 1994, p. 2165). In contemporary Britain, inquiry after inquiry has sought to explain and contain declining standards in public life. The 1994 Nolan Committee, for example, was a creature of public concern, a response to the publics general dissatisfaction with politics and politicians, compounded by a perception of a collective outing of expected or acceptable standards by public gures, or those in the public view, as they indulge in bed-hopping, self-enrichment, inuence-peddling, and rule-bending (Doig, 1996, p. 51). In Japan, nine of the fteen Prime Ministers who held ofce in the period 19551993 were involved in corruption scandals. At least half its members of Parliament, it is estimated, could have obtained their seats through the aid of illegal nancing (Nelkin and Levi, 1996, p. 2). In Italy, corruption has become so rampant in recent years that the health of the economy is threatened. The latest studies estimate that the political parties may have siphoned off as much as $100 billion over the last decadeabout a tenth of Italys national debt (U.S. News and World Report, 1993, p. 44). The conclusion of the European Unions Court of Auditors in its 1994 annual report was: fraud, mismanagement, corruption: they are omnipresent in the European Union (Economist, 1994, p. 58), may also apply to every other region of the world. Character issues are ubiquitous. Character, of course, is not just manifest by the presence or absence of sex or nancial scandals, corrupt deals, fraudulent activity, or some other behavior that breaks a public trust for private gain. Any behavior that breaks the moral rules of the community, including generally accepted standards of private behavior, may give clues to ones character. The public ofcial who does not keep commitments, who is not forthright, who, in the face of criticism, is not steadfast yet open to constructive compromise, or who is not consistent

Basic Laws, 11 of which were enacted between 1958 and 1992. To date, Israel is still one of the few members of the United Nations with no formal constitution, and two generations have been socialized without the educational impact of a constitution. Religion, in fact, was granted more importance than a constitution as an integrative mechanism for state building. Israel followed the millet system of the Ottoman Empire, which was largely continued by the British Mandate in Palestine. Freedom was granted to all religions, with each having its own courts and exclusive jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, alimony, and other personal matters. British Mandate local-level laws and regulations of public religious observance were also continued in Israeli communities. The only observance laws enacted on a national level, however, were those affecting the Jewish community. Chief among them were laws regarding the observance of the Jewish Sabbath, holidays, and dietary rules (Edelman 1994:4872). The dominant mode of the 1950s was that of formal religious liberty, with Judaism functioning as the ofcial religion in practice. In the absence of a constitution, any signicant attempt to separate state and religion was aborted by Labor. The leadership of the party did not realize the implications of its legitimacy-seeking behavior for the coming years. It adopted religion as an integral part of Jewish nationalism, the only type of nationalism to be represented by the state. It enacted the 1950 Law of Return, granting every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel, and the 1952 Citizenship Law, granting every Jewish immigrant Israeli citizenship. Step by step, an ethnic democracy emerged, with Jews at the center and Arabs as a minority with equal citizenship rights but no opportunities to exercise their nationalism (Peled 1992). To ensure the supply of legitimacy, the Labor leadership consistently blurred and converted religious symbols into national symbols in its political rhetoric. That was also the standard in the formal education system. Religion became essential for communication in both the political and the sociocultural systems. This development has beneted the religious parties, which increased their pressures to infuse religion into state affairs (Shapiro, 1996:5261). Labor demonstrated little resistance to the pressures. A secularreligious division in the midst of state building was too risky for the party. The Labor-led government also needed the votes of the religious parties in the parliament (Knesset). The partnership that developed between the ruling party and the religious parties throughout the 1950s became the cornerstone of the Israeli political system. The religious parties, with an average of something below one-sixth of the total electoral power, were always the vital block required to form the parliamentary majority upon which the secularly controlled left or right coalition governments could be built. With the exception of a few interim periods, the religious parties always served as key power brokers in the ruling coalition government. The religious parties used their bargaining leverage to acquire a privileged status for the Jewish religion in state affairs and to take over disproportionately large slices of the government budget. Within a short time, Orthodox women and yeshiva (theological college) students were exempted from compulsory military service. A state-funded religious school system was developed independently from the general education system. A state-funded rabbinical court system, in charge of personal matters like marriage and divorce, was developed independently within the judicial system. Its judges were trained and certied by the Rabbinical Council, the chief interpreter of religious law, which in practice became a quasilegislative body. The council also licensed marriage, divorce, and kosher dining establish-

mance of these two roles would be ideal, but it is rarely achieved and seems almost impossible because any such balanced administrative action will require an equal division and exercise of power by the administrative state in society. It also requires an autonomy from private business, especially the corporate sector, a constitutional legitimacy, and an ability to take from capital and distribute it to those whose consent is necessary for system maintenance. None of these requirements can be satisfactorily met, because the modern state is not and never has been neutral. The administrative state is dependent on and is mainly controlled by capital; it does not have a recognized status of constitutional legitimacy; and it is always subject to charges of limiting capital accumulation and liberty. This is because taking from capital and giving to others for system maintenance decreases capital accumulation and would enlarge the public sector that may seek autonomy and,in an alliance with a massive clientele, attempt to challenge the corporate sector (Connolly 1984; Habermas 1984; Held et al. 1983). This would be destructive to the reign of the corporate sector. The business sector would not tolerate it, as it never has. However, reality shows that the state usually takes over unprotable but necessary operations and/or is absorbing the cost of looking after that part of the labor force which technological change has made redundant (Macpherson 1987:67). The incoherent nature of the modern administrative welfare state has also been explained by economist Kenneth Arrow (1963), who shows the problem of internal contradictions in dening a democratic social welfare function. The welfare state is also called impossible, according to Heidenheimer et al. (1983:330), because it fails to satisfy socialist criteria for production organized around social needs rather than prot motives. [and] the welfare state also fails to satisfy conservative criteria for maximizing individual liberty. It does not leave people, as Milton Freedman put it, free to choose, and it neither fully accepts nor rejects market mechanisms. The result is a legitimacy crisis of the state in general and the administrative state in particular. The last source of crisis in the administrative state is the problems facing the economic and sociopolitical systems. As discussed earlier, the international politico-economic challenges facing the United States and the internal crises emanating from major economic recessions and depressions and political crisis, and so on, of the 1970s and 1980s, have resulted in a condence gap on the part of the masses and, therefore, a general crisis in the system. Evidence is abundant, Skolnick and Currie (1985) suggest, that the crisis in American Institutions covers the family, environment, workplace, health, education, welfare, and national security. Schott (1984) shows the persistence of economic problems in capitalist states. Greenberg (1986), Parenti (1983), Habermas (1984), Connolly (1984), Thayer (1984), Macpherson (1987), and others also show how signicant the legitimacy crisis in America is. Generally, this blame has been shifted to the government and its administrative state.

Disappointed by European liberalism and nationalism, Jews began to formulate their own solution to anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth century. It was Zionist liberal nationalism, an ideology of freedom and equality in the context of Jewish national history and culture. Central to the ideology was its implementation in a national home in a dened territory (Palestine) in order to protect and preserve a society that had been persecuted for centuries. Moreover, the implementation of the ideology, according to European nationalism, could only be in a sovereign political system with a strong security and defense system to protect the society (Avineri 1991:182215; Safran 1981:1423). Thus, the rst task of Zionism, the political movement nourished by the ideology, was to develop its social systems with functional mechanisms for political independence, security, and defense. The movement organized its own political system with two major mechanisms: the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. The organization represented Jewish communities worldwide and the agency was its Palestines branch. The agency led the Jewish community in Palestine until independence, when it transferred most of its functions to the government of the new state. The movement also organized its security system with two functional mechanisms: a massive settlement and a strong army. Jewish settlements were founded throughout Palestine, especially in frontier areas along the border of the future state, where the presence of settlers strengthened security and defense (Ben-Zadok 1985). Three illegal underground military organizations were established during British rule over Palestine (1918 1948), and after independence these were united into one armythe Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (Safran 1981:4445). Both systems, politics and security, were capable of maintaining themselves in the complex pre-state environment through the successful steering of their functional mechanisms. That is, both systems achieved a reasonable degree of system integration. The environment, however, rapidly became extremely turbulent toward the establishment of the state in 1948. That was due to the extermination of the Jewish community in Europe in World War II and the conict with the Arab neighbors in Palestine. These dangers to system integration, to the steering capacity, threatened social integration. That is, the communication of institutions and values focused on the possibility that both systems might not be able to deliver the promised security. The symbolic organization of each system, the life world, could become unstable and disintegrate. When the rst Arab-Israeli war began in 1948, however, the political and security systems demonstrated successful steering and were skillful in preventing system crisis. By that time, the security content began to dominate Israeli communication. The perception and concept of security society soon prevailed (Shapiro 1996:2325, 7073). A feeling of relative safety followed in communication patterns. The actual crisis broke out well into the state periodon its 25th anniversary.

tions and values of the security society. Specialized sectors pressed for the redistribution of economic and status rewards and tried to benet themselves from a society pie which was more open to grab due to the power vacuum created by the crisis. More dened distinctions were drawn among class, ethnic, culture, and lifestyle groups. A relative social heterogeneity replaced the old homogeneity of the security society. An important symbolic reinterpretation process which continued into the 1980s evolved around the land itself. On one hand, the value of the historic territory was reconrmed after the 1967 war and Jewish settlements were established in the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights. On the other hand, the value of the same physical territory as a secure base for survival was conrmed as fragile in 1973. Thus, the old consensus around the centrality of the land was broken. The public discourse then turned to a debate over the land and its relation to the fundamentals of Zionism. On each side of the mainstream debate, an extreme reinterpretation of the connection to the land has been popularized into the 1980s. On one side, it was the fundamentalist right-wing (e.g., Gush Emunim) reinterpretation which called for aggressive Jewish settlement in the historic land despite the Arab inhabitants. On the other side, it was the reinterpretation of Israelis from all walks of life that Jews can be safe in territories other than Israel, where the conict with the Arabs seemed endless. These Israelis constituted the bulk of the immigration wave to western countries, which accelerated dramatically after the war.
VII. CRISIS MANAGEMENT The new communication contents described in the previous section shaped the public discourse into the 1980s. They were instrumental for crisis management in all social systems. The physical territory as the base for survival and the security society as the salient feature of private and public life have remained the dominant communication contents in Israel. The 1973 war crisis pointed out that these contents were practically irreplaceable for the public as a whole. At the same time, they had to be drastically revised and modied. The 1982 war in Lebanon required a further albeit smaller revision. Crisis management in the system of society involved slow and long content revisions and social changes, which continued into the 1980s. Their seeds are indicated in the previous section and are self-explanatory. Crisis management in the security and political systems involved specic strategies, all implemented in the 1970. After the Rabin government entered ofce in June 1974, it began a 3-year rehabilitation program of the IDF. It was funded by the United States, which practically became the sole supplier of military aid, for $1.5 billion a year. It included the import of massive machinery and high technology. The combat forces were also enlarged. Following the recommendations of the Agranat Commission, the military-civil constitutional balance was restored. The mechanisms of civil control over the army were restructured. The communication channels between the Ministry of Defense and the IDF improved. Nonetheless, the bureaucracy in the Ministry still lacked control over the IDFs nance, procurement, intelligence, strategic planning, and research (Ben-Meir 1995). The Rabin government also took steps to save the economy from collapse. The war had tremendous negative economic impacts. The immediate problems were the low productivity and the international oil crisis. Later, defense imports reached a climax, along with huge trade decits. Economic growth was stied and a decade-long ination process

of work. A study by Hamelin (1987) of truck drivers suggests that risks are actually highest in the rst 4 hours of duty unless the total work period exceeds 12 hours. Wharf (1993) found a distinct peak of signal passed at danger incidents among railroad engineers in the second hour of duty. Folkard (1996a and 1996b) found a similar peak in a more general review of industrial injury rates. It is hypothesized by Dyer-Smith (1997) that the explanation of the 2- to 4-hour peak lies in the interaction of engagement and habituation, two effects that he describes as individually linear but acting in opposite directions. When an operative starts duty, he or she is usually mentally alert and concentrating on the task in hand; in other words, engagement is high. If the task, such as driving, is familiar and routine, habituation sets in over time. Given predictable stimuli, says Dyer-Smith, performance of the task demands diminishing mental resources as responses become virtually automated. We can all think of behavior patterns that become routine and mental processes that lose none of their effectiveness by becoming unconscious. The 2- to 4-hour peak could be attributable to the fact that while engagement is falling off, automatization is not yet at maximum efciency. Within this window, the potential for failure in the human/machine interface is heightened. It is difcult to know what implications this research has for the design of institutions and procedures concerned with preventing accidents and emergencies. At the least, we could say that an awareness of the 2- to 4-hour peak might caution operatives in safetycritical areas to be especially on their guard. Technological aids to vigilance might be improved. Further research might illuminate the risks at work from boredom and fatigue and approaches might be found to meet them. The conclusion from the argument so far, and it is a somewhat depressing one, is that while technology itselfalong with institutional frameworks of regulation, inspection, monitoring, etc.is a considerable insurance against emergencies arising from failures at the human/machine interface, it cannot guarantee perfect safety. As a result, much interest in emergency management focuses on the containment of risk. In other words, having been forced to accept that somewhere along the line failure may sooner or later occur, we seek to quantify the risks and minimize them wherever possible.
IV. LIVING WITH RISK It is important to note that risks may be tolerated as the price of securing certain benets, and that this may be done in the belief that the risks are being controlled. The knowledge that nearly 4000 people die every year in road accidents across the United Kingdom, with injuries to many more, does not discourage people from incurring the risks associated with driving. To say that we tolerate a risk does not mean that we ignore it or regard it as negligible but that it is a factor that needs to be kept under review and further reduced if possible. If we say that a risk is acceptable, on the other hand, it means that, in relation to life or work, we are willing to take it more or less as it is. A woman who wants a child will not change her mind if she learns that the average chance of death due to pregnancy and childbirth is around one in 10,000. We may dene risk as the chance that some event that affects us adversely will occur. To take a risk means deliberately incurring that chance, while estimating a risk involves dening the adverse event precisely and establishing a means of calculating how often it is likely to happen in particular circumstances. When we use the word chance,

Thus the president can, at his own discretion, nullify all the previous match and expenditure requirements that were established to encourage local and state mitigation and response plans (NAPA 1993). And state leaders, knowing this, have pressed as hard as possible for all they can get. With the cameras rolling, the disaster victims standing in shock, and all of the local and state ofcials surrounding the president in the role of strong leader, the temptation is often too great for the president to resist opening up the federal largesse. While this plays well on the evening news and CNN and potentially boosts a presidents poll ratings, it also undercuts the incentive for mitigation measures by state and local communities before a disaster strikes by raising the possibility that an area will be able to receive aid regardless of its slighting of mitigation and response efforts. In effect, when a disaster does strike, it sets in motion is something like a game of Monopoly, in which everyone except the American taxpayer has the potential to acquire a forgiveness of sins card. While some states take the mitigation and planning process seriously, others bet on the likelihood that if something happens, the federal government will cover the costs. Thus states such as California will make a serious attempt to develop and maintain an effective emergency management system while other states will not only underfund emergency management, but will use their representatives in Congress to attack FEMA for not giving them 100% of the recovery costs when a disaster strikes. Since the funds are federal and raised from across the width and breadth of the country, the states that experience relatively fewer or less frequent disasters or put greater effort into mitigation and response end up covering a large portion of the costs of states that experience more frequent disasters or put less effort into mitigation and response. This means that they are effectively and unfairly shifting the scal burden away from the citizens of some states to those of another. In essence, some become free riders. The inevitable end result of the conjunction between the process of presidential aggrandizement, the evolutionary changes in news media, and the free rider mentality of some states is that state and local variances allow the building of high-rise hotels and casinos into sand dunes along hurricane coasts, river cities refuse to construct ood walls, nuclear power plants are built on earthquake faults, and farmers till ood plainsand, of course, the American taxpayer foots the bill. In the end, all the political actorspresidents, governors, and mayorscome out looking like heroes and strong leaders while the media help to perpetuate the scal shell game. But presidents benet the most, and since the presidency is a national ofce and the national scal resources are the greatest, the overall result is the nationalization of disasters on both political and scal terms. Eventually, though, the media do leave, and presidents, along with other elected ofcials, look for new opportunities to be seen as leaders. FEMA, along with the other government agencies at all levels charged with dealing with the disaster, are left to struggle with the disasters aftermath, which often lingers for years. FEMA needs the support of the president for the longer haul, but often his or her agenda is full of other more pressing problems. This lack of sustained presidential attention has so far been dealt with through the placement of persons who it was assumed could be political sentinels; persons whose major qualication has been that of political and personal loyalty rather than knowledge of either the politics of Washington or emergency management. While plausible enough in theory, the placement of presidential sentinels within FEMA has created historical problems that, ultimately, work to undermine not only the agencys effectiveness and legitimacy but also presidential authority.

LESSONS FROM THE POWELL DUFFRYN INCIDENT
The Powell Duffryn re itself was spectacular and personally affected nearly 2000 people who were evacuated from their homes. The disaster represented a threat to the health and safety of the adjoining community for a protracted period of ve weeks. Nevertheless, there was no loss of life directly from the re or the initial explosions. Most of the participants involved in ghting the re and in the emergency response rated their mutual effectiveness immediately afterward as good (Hobby, 1995). Although the outcome of the Powell Duffryn incident did not result in human tragedy, it had the potential for a very different outcome. The storage tanks that were on re were the smallest in the compound and held 220,000 gallons of ammable chemicals. Yet, close to those tanks were massive tanks with capacities of 1 million gallons each
and four tanks that could hold 3 million gallons each (NOAA, 1995). The inventory of hazardous material storage sites in the county fuels speculation of what could have happened because hazardous sites in other locations also adjoin residential areas. Powell Duffryn is not even one of the larger operations with hazardous materials (Langley, 1996). Nor does Powell Duffryn even typically handle very hazardous materials. The chemicals that they normally store are generally considered to be not especially volatile. The National Fire Protection Association even rates crude sulfate turpentine, the material that caught re, as a stable chemical (Benedetti, 1995). Yet, the combination of circumstances together represented the potential for a great human disaster. A. Need For Up-to-Date and Immediately Available Details on Hazardous-Material Sites When the re department arrived on the scene, knowledge about the particular hazardous materials that were involved or the cause of the incident, i.e., what was on re, were not available and would not be for over ve hours. If the re department had known soon after their arrival what they were dealing with, most of the problems encountered and the serious threats to the community that developed subsequently would never have matured. Up-to-date information regarding storage of hazardous-material products, their amounts, and their specic locations within storage facilities can improve the management of an emergency response. In this case, existing legal reporting requirements proved to be inadequate for both reghting safety and resource planning. The records that were led in the state EPD ofces were neither useful nor immediately available to the re department commanders on the scene. In addition, because the reported information could be out-of-date, it may be obsolete. Current, contemporaneous databases that can be made immediately available to local emergency units would vastly improve emergency response and crisis risk assessment. The presence of hazardous materials in close proximity to noncompatible hazardous chemicals also represents potential dangers if they should ever interact. The berm area intended for spilled material retention should be planned to prevent mixing of spilled product from adjacent storage vessels. Individual berms or retention walls for each tank would substantially reduce the potential for the creation of new products when spilled chemicals mix and interact. In the case of Powell Duffryn, sodium hydrosulde (NaSH), stored in one tank that was leaking, reacted with the chemical Briquest that was stored in a totally different, but adjacent, tank. The Briquest started to drip from a pipe attached to its tank that had been damaged by the initial explosion. The two chemicals reacted in the water that lled the berm enclosure that held all the liquid material coming from the several tanks as well as the external water applied to the tanks to cool them. Together the mixture generated toxic, and potentially lethal, hydrogen sulde gas (NOAA, 1995). A member of the USCG Atlantic Strike Force described her surprise to discover the violent nature of the chemical activity in the berm enclosed pool: The reaction within the toxic pool was a surprise. unexpected. the reaction was so strong it felt like a whirlpool. that bubbly feeling. against your legs, through the containment suits (Woodson, 1995). The delay that was believed to be prudent on the part of the re department in the management of their response appears to have actually allowed for the creation of the situation wherein the stable chemicals came to be mixed resulting in violent, toxic effervescence. The delay was also partly the cause of the subsequent pollution of the marsh and

services (Hong Kong 1997:308). The roles and responsibilities of various departments, such as the Civil Aviation Department (in case of an air crash), FSD, and RHKP in effecting rescue operations are outlined. In short, the HKDP provides for on site command and control, and off-site command and coordination in the event of a disaster (Ying 1995:115). The plan provides specic guidelines for dealing with disasters by outlining the roles of the City and New Territories Administration (CNTA), the Information Services Department (ISD), and the Hospital Authority (HA). The rst two bodies are given the task of overseeing press activities and arranging briengs to the media, while the HA provides hospital services for the victims. The GSECC is responsible for obtaining and issuing policy directives on behalf of the Governors Security Committee (GSC, now to be referred as the chief executives Security Committee), Chief Secretary (CS),2 and Secretary for Security (SforS); advising GSC on the need for enactment of emergency legislation for dealing with the disaster; providing a permanent link with the SforS through which decisions on policy matters can be made by the departments concerned; coordinating the acquisition and mobilization of civil and military resources and those of outside agencies; liaising with departments for obtaining and collating information on the overall situation as it develops; acting as a link through which urgent public messages could be issued from the government secretariat for publication or broadcast; brieng senior public ofcials on the situation; and performing any other duties set out in the GSECC Guide, the Internal Security Guide, contingency plans or as may be required by GSC, CS and/or SforS at the time (Security Branch 1994:9). Liaison ofcers from various departments will perform specic tasks related to their own organizations. For example, the Transport Department (TD) duty ofcer will establish contact with public transport operators and keep GSECC informed of the situation (1994:9), and other departments will fulll their part in contributing to the rescue process. The HKDP devotes considerable attention to recovery management following the control of disasters to return the community to a condition acceptable by that community. The physical, psychological, and social needs of the community can be satised by providing accommodation, food, clothing, and relief funds; responding to inquiries from the public; and following up with an inquiry into the causes and effects of the disaster. The relevant District Ofcer 3 from City and New Territories Administration will set up his own emergency co-ordination centre and co-ordinate relief measures to be provided by Social Welfare Department, Housing Department and other agencies (Ying 1995: 115). Temporary shelters are to be arranged, and the Social Welfare Department (SWD) is responsible for providing essential relief items to the victims. The district ofcer (DO) will assist the Police in dealing with inquiries at the scene from members of the public, while the Director of Information Services will be responsible for disseminating information on the situation to the public through the media and government departments concerned.; and the SWD will be responsible, in conjunction with the Housing department, for establishing a combined registration Centre for disaster victims (Security Branch 1994:1112). This will be followed by restoration management in order to release the disaster site as soon as possible. The plan indicates the respective roles and responsibilities of the relevant agencies and also reiterates that government departments should carry out their normal functions as far as possible. This is a tall order, as public agencies are usually burdened with a heavy workload. It has been suggested that military units may be called upon to help, but with the departure of the British armed forces personnel prior to the handover of Hong

battles, loosing their homes, elds, and lives to never ending cycle of death and destruction. Lebanons Shia population was by then the largest and the poorest among its many religious sects. Inhabiting rural agricultural areas in the south of Lebanon as well as the Bekka valley, they were disenfranchised at the outset of the Lebanese crisis, second class citizens in relation to the political and economic power that many Christians and Sunni Moslems enjoyed. Amals main objective was a sovereign and democratic Lebanese regime based on a deconfessionalized polity in which the Shia would hold a political majority. Another occurrence of deconfessionalism for the sake of confessional aggrandizement. Nonetheless a new force appeared in the wake of the vacuum created by the departure of the PLO and IDF. A break away Islamic Shia force called Hizballah, or the party of God, began to contest secular Amal for the hearts and minds of the Shia in Lebanon. F. Irans Intervention
Hizballahs historical, religious and nancial ties to the Shia Islamic regime in Iran emanated from that countrys objective of exporting its successful 1979 Islamic revolution (Jaber 1997: 31; Ranstorp 1997: 119). Iran targeted Lebanon for its extension of political Islam. Yet the situation was delicate because Iran was caught between Hizballah and Syria. The latter had been the only Arab state to support Persian Iran in its long war during the 1980s against Arab Iraq. Thus Hizballahs activities in Lebanon have been linked with Syria and Iran in a triangle of cooperation and conict. Hizballah origins began as a Shia response to the 19751988 Lebanese civil war, a reaction to growing dissatisfaction with Maronite and Sunni public policy which left this Islamic sect outside political power and economic privilege. It gained its impetus and established itself as a military-political force in the context of the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1982. Hizballahs guerrilla actions against Israels occupation were instrumental in Israels retreat from Lebanon. This was the rst time that Israel gave up captured Arab lands without achieving anything in return. Israels routing of the PLO provided an opportunity for Hizballah. The geographic vacuity left by the departure of the PLO and IDF was in large part lled by Hizballah, which was never close to the secular and Sunni PLO, but, on the other hand, this sacred Shia force was publicly pledged to regain Palestine and Jerusalems Islamic Holy shrines. Israels IDF provided a easy target for Hizballahs carefully planned hit and run guerrilla tactics, loosing on one occasion 75 soldiers in a single explosion the southern city of Tyre. As previously indicated, American and French UNF contingents were also victims of Hizballahs suicide bombings. Hizballah and Amal fought an intramural turf battle, with the former gaining the upper hand until Syria halted the ghting. The success of Hizballahs actions against Israel, PLO, French, Americans and even its secular counterparts in Lebanon, attracted many young Shia men and other supporters to its organizational discipline and religious fervor. Hizballah also achieved public support through operation of schools, clinics, and other welfare services for the Shia population. In the minds of many, Shia and otherwise, it was Hizballah which hastened the departure from Lebanon of western military and political inuence. Later, kidnappings of western citizens all but eliminated Americans and western Europeans from Lebanon. Hizballah was an indigenous entity, pledging hope and dignity for a people so long subjugated under imperialism. Close personal relationships between Shia and Iranian clerics, stimulated by the success of the Iranian revolution, sparked the organization of a tight knit and secret hierarchical elite Hizballah. Iran sent money, arms, and cadres to train Hizballahs mili-

VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS Direct compensation, economic incentives, and massive funds for cleanups have been some of the approaches proposed to redress the unequal share of benets and burdens of toxic hazards and pollution problems. The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) of 1986 provides a source of billions of dollars for cleanup of toxic sites. The funds come from nes paid by toxic waste producers and are administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). But the results of even massive spending on cleanup of toxic sites, or emergency response to accidents that result from hazards associated with them, do not address the social ills that allow people, perhaps even motivates them, to continue to live in danger from exposure and emergencies that may come from such hazards. A. Judicial Remedies
If the local citizens who enjoy economic benet are not the same citizens who pay the incidence costs, there is not equal protection afforded all under the law. As previously cited, the equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment is a legal remedy only if litigants can prove disparate impact by showing a state harbored, discriminatory purpose (Godsil, 1991, p. 397). But the 14th Amendment also states in part that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Referring to the letter of the law seems in itself to be contradictory. Case law supports the statutory authority under 1983 for civil rights actions brought by individuals to enforce constitutional rights (Monroe v. Pape, 1961). There are two essential elements of such actions: [1] the conduct must be committed by a person acting under the color of state law; and [2] the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States (Parratt v. Taylor, 1981). Disparate impact is a standard of proof that relates to a statute, neutral on its face, that bears more heavily on one race than on another (Washington v. Davis, 1976, p. 241). However, the Davis case also held that invidious purpose was necessary to trigger strict scrutiny of a government action that is neutral on its face (Tribe, 1988). The burden of proof that a land use siting is motivated by a discriminatory purpose is problematic. However, it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The court, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977), outlined ve relevant factors as evidentiary sources: (1) the impact on one race vs. another; (2) historical background, e.g., a series of invidious actions; (3) the sequence of events preceding a decision; (4) any departures from normal procedures; and (5) legislative and administrative history, e.g., minutes of meetings and reports. Two cases involving the siting of non-hazardous waste landlls have attempted to apply the equal protection doctrine to resolve the issue of hazards imposed on adjacent communities composed of minorities. These cases are East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Assn. v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission (1989), and Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp. (1979). Both cases address the issue of intentional racial impact and neighborhood decline but speak as well to hazards that ultimately can result in emergency response and permanent health damage. However, both cases failed to provide sufcient evidence to establish that racial discrimination motivated the siting even though the evidence did ascertain the disproportionate affects on minorities. Perhaps future courts will interpret disparate impact regarding land use differently or Congress will pass legislation dening its intent, i.e., that disparate impact should be judged by the consequences. Also mentioned earlier, in employment discrimination cases the court interprets disparate impact differently. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) is the landmark case that established the emphasis on the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation that seems to be the standard in land use decisions. Accordingly,

Brokering Belonging

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lisa rose mar

Chinese in Canadas Exclusion Era, 18851945
Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford Universitys objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam
Copyright 2010 by Oxford University Press, Inc.
Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mar, Lisa Rose. Brokering belonging : Chinese in Canadas exclusion era, 1885-1945 / Lisa Rose Mar. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-973313-2; 978-0-19-973314-9 (pbk.) 1. ChineseBritish ColumbiaVancouverHistory19th century. 2. ChineseBritish ColumbiaVancouverHistory20th century. 3. ImmigrantsBritish ColumbiaVancouverHistory. 4. ChineseLegal status, laws, etc.CanadaHistory. 5. Emigration and immigration law CanadaHistory. 6. ChineseBritish ColumbiaVancouverPolitics and government. 7. BrokersBritish ColumbiaVancouverHistory. 8. Civic leadersBritish ColumbiaVancouverHistory. 9. Community lifeBritish ColumbiaVancouverHistory. 10. Vancouver (B.C.)Ethnic relations. I. Title. F1089.5.V22M305.8009711dc22 2009049009
1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
Dedicated to the memory of Edgar Wickberg

acknowledgments

oing research and writing a book is a labor of love, and I was fortunate to enjoy the generous help of many colleagues, friends, and family members. Brokering Belonging is dedicated to the memory of Edgar Wickberg of the University of British Columbia. Ed was a kind mentor and incisive critic in my journeys through Chinese Canadian history since my undergraduate student days. Eds intellectual generosity, broad approach to knowledge, and commitment to community history have guided my own academic work. Following his example, I learned to read modern and classical Chinese. These skills revealed new evidence so compelling that I put aside my dissertation and started an entirely new book organized around the insight that Chinese Canadians had approached Canada, the United States, and China as a single field of opportunity. Eds critical readings of this books early chapters reflected his deep immersion in Chinese diaspora, Chinese, Canadian, U.S., and Asian American history. My dear friend Andrea Goldman, a China historian at the University of California, Los Angeles, proved a steadfast intellectual companion throughout the research and writing process. She read through a number of early draft chapters, and we discussed Brokering Belonging from start to finish, including during many late night phone calls. Andrea helped to strengthen the books connections to China studies, and she was a helpful critic of Asian American history. She offered both theoretical and practical suggestions which helped the book reach its full potential. Timothy Brook, a China historian at the University of British Columbia, was my graduate advisor at the University of Toronto. I am grateful for
his gracious collegiality, his professional support, and his critical reading of both early chapters and the full manuscript. Tims comments improved both the Canadian and Chinese aspects of the book, as well as its organization. Brokering Belongings conceptual structure is most strongly inspired by modern Chinese history, particularly local elite-society relations. As a mentor, Tim continues to have an important impact on my intellectual development. Patricia Roy, a Canadian political historian, British Columbia specialist, and race relations expert at the University of Victoria, read several early chapters. She offered invaluable criticisms, editorial advice, and guidance. Every page of Brokering Belonging builds on Pats foundational research into Canadas Asian-white race relations. Pats impressive breadth of knowledge strengthened this book, and she generously shared tips about relevant archival collections. I am grateful to her for being a model colleague and scholar. I also appreciate Gordon Chang, an Asian American historian at Stanford University, for being a mentor since I first ventured into Chinese Canadian research as an undergraduate student. I benefited from his sage counsel and his scholarly mastery of Asian American, U.S., and China studies. Gordon read the entire manuscript, and he offered extraordinarily helpful criticisms that made Brokering Belonging into a better book. My editor, Susan Ferber of Oxford University Press, contributed helpful advice in the developmental years of the project, and she also helped to guide the mature manuscript toward more effective focus. Susans thoughtful edits and responsive feedback have made Brokering Belonging a stronger, leaner, and more accessible book. In addition to Susan, I would like to thank the readers and editors from three university presses, who greatly improved this books content, concepts, and organization. These included six very generous anonymous readers who offered many criticisms and suggestions. At Oxford University Press, I enjoyed working with helpful production editor Jennifer Kowing and copy editor Merryl Sloane, whose careful reading and insight made this book better throughout. Len Husband of the University of Toronto Press, and Stacy Wagner of Stanford University Press also greatly contributed. Many of my colleagues at the University of Maryland, College Park, also read chapters, and I am grateful for their help. As a mentor, Julie Greene offered helpful feedback on the introduction and book proposal. Her advice also helped to guide my navigation through the book publishing process. Gary Gerstle helped to sharpen the projects conceptual framework. Robyn Muncy encouraged a deeper exploration of social movements. Saverio Giovachinni contributed the concept of an alternative public sphere. David viii

interpreter David Lew (Liao Hongxiang), attempted to depose Yip in 1910, conflict broke out between the two leaders Chinese and Anglo supporters in Canada, the United States, and China.25 At the time, Chinese illegal immigration was an open secret.26 Many Chinese Canadians complained, however, that Vancouvers immigration officials, including Yip, extorted excessive amounts of cash from new arrivals.27 Taking advantage of the situation, Lew brought together leading members of the citys anti-Asian movement with Chinese Canadian businesspeople who feared Yips dominance. To the Chinese Canadian public, Lew offered himself as a more effective defender of his people than Yip. In 1910, he arranged to meet with Canadas prime minister, Wilfrid Laurier, to discuss Chinese immigrants concerns.28 However, Lew had garnered his political access through a devils bargain. Prominent white members of Vancouvers anti-Asian movement made a deal with Lew to expose Vancouvers immigration officials misdeeds. Lew hoped to secure a political appointment as the ports new Chinese immigration interpreter, whereas the anti-Asianists wanted to expose Yips protectors, their rivals in Canadas ruling Liberal Party.29 This clash of Chinese power brokers and their Anglo allies bears little resemblance to the oft-told story of Anglo discrimination and Chinese response.30 Instead, Chinese consistently interacted with and exercised influence upon their non-Chinese neighbors. While Brokering Belonging traces Chinese immigrant power brokers ongoing negotiations with Anglo society, it roots their continuing work as actors in a larger Pacific world. The maxim all politics is local frequently applied, but in British Columbia, the local was often global. There, Canada met a Pacific world that included the British Empire, the United States, and East Asia. British Columbias chief city, Vancouver, housed one of North Americas largest Chinese populations and was a gateway for Chinese slipping illegally into the United States. Both Chinese and Anglos shared a West Coast culture that crossed the U.S.-Canada border. They also felt keenly aware of distinctions between Canada, which was a dominion of the British Empire, and the United States.31 West Coast Chinese also shared common origins in Guangdong, China.32 For both Chinese and Anglos, Vancouvers role as the Chinese capital of Canada33 made it a pivotal site in West Coast struggles over Chinese migrations future. The resulting Chinese-Anglo brokerage relations involved local contexts, but also ties to the larger Pacific world where Canada strived to make its mark. Indeed, Chinese Canadian power brokers played an unacknowledged role in the foundation of immigration studies through collaborations with social science interviewers. In 1924, they organized a community campaign to manage visiting U.S. researchers from the Chicago School of Sociology who

less on wealth or patron-client relations and more on the active consciousness of thousands of Chinese. Chapter 3, Popularizing Politics, explores how these new leaders burst onto the political stage in 1922 with a year-long mass protest movement against public school segregation. While this protest has been regarded as a local Chinese-Anglo conflict, Chinese evidence reveals it to be a transpacific event, rooted in global anti-colonial nationalist movements after the First World War.56 Anti-segregation leaders joined new social movements across the Pacific world that mobilized ordinary people to political protest. Besides making British and Canadian claims, leaders alluded to mass protests against British colonialism in China and India. Their efforts paralleled rising labor unions and emulated related campaigns by Chinese Americans. Their populism provoked severe backlashes from some Chinese and Anglo business leaders, but the social movements power to bring ordinary people into brokerage politics could not be undone. Chapter 4, Fixing Knowledge, examines how astute intellectuals among these new brokers attempted to reshape public discourse about Chinese in Canada and the United States. As the first major academic survey of East Asian immigrants opinions began in 1924, its director, Robert Park of the University of Chicago, opined that Asians appeared to be more like blacks than whites.57 Chinese Canadian leaders in Vancouver believed that they could not leave the Survey of Race Relations outcome to chance, so they coordinated the interview data that researchers would find.58 Chinese leaders countered Parks assumptions that Asians adapted more slowly than European immigrants by claiming that their own lives heralded Chinese Canadians future as an educated, assimilated, deferential, and hard-working model minority. Their performance built on and added to nascent U.S.Canada debates about factoring immigrants into more pluralistic visions of national life, rather than enforcing Anglo conformity. Chinese in Victoria, Seattle, and San Francisco then did likewise, planting the seeds of enduring immigrant myths in the United States and Canada.59 The new brokerage coincided with an era of intense racial pressures. In 1923, Canadas Parliament ended legal Chinese immigration.60 Still, in the 1920s, Chinese Canadians were more integrated into greater Vancouver than in the past. Despite racial segregation in most public schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and public accommodations, over half of Chinese spoke English.61 Chinese were scattered across more than forty integrated city blocks of Vancouvers East Side. They often lived among other outsiders: non-British European immigrants, lower-class Anglo migrant workers, Jews, Japanese, and African Canadians. Chinese also mingled with non-Chinese in gambling houses, saloons, soccer fields, and movie theaters.62 Only Chinatowns center,

disembarked.69 The guards locked Wong in a cell with iron bars until his father, a shopkeeper in Cumberland, British Columbia, could travel to Vancouver to claim him. Wong had never been outside China and was terrified. The British guards teased him mercilessly, calling him a pig and other names he did not understand. They also cut off his queue, the long hair worn by Chinese males as a sign of loyalty to Chinas government.70 As each day passed in jail, Wong and other Chinese passengers grew more anxious, fearing that they would be sent back to China. To free his son, Wongs father first had to bribe the Chinese interpreter, Yip On.71 Next, Yip On interviewed the father and son separately in the presence of Anglo official J. Mackenzie Bowell, who did not understand Chinese. Yip declared that the fathers answers matched those of his son and that the father was a legitimate merchant whose family was exempt from paying the head tax.72 Wong was free to go, but Canadas sorting process had left an unwelcome message. Many Canadians, he later wrote, treat the Chinese as devils and dogs.73 Anglo officials seeking to collect the head tax often asked for the Chinese interpreters advice to help them decide cases. Otherwise, they had great difficulty determining whether Chinese deserved exemptions. The legal categories were ambiguous. The law exempted merchants from the head tax but gave little guidance about how to verify claims.74 The law also stipulated that each Chinese should pay only once and that British subjects, such as naturalized citizens and Canadian-born individuals, were exempt.75 Many Chinese attempted to evade the head tax by making fraudulent claims.76 In addition, the law sometimes seemed to imply contradictory actions. While officials were supposed to reject any Chinese likely to become unemployed, the law instructed them to deny entry to any immigrant with a prearranged job.77 Officials also had the power to turn back any entrant deemed unsuitable.78 Chinas government provided no reliable documentation on any of these factors, and Chinese interpreters became key actors in determining how the law affected individual immigrants. As a result, Chinese regarded Canadas immigration system as arbitrary. In the detention shed, the young Wong probably heard other Chinese talking about Yip On. Chinese who made their travel arrangements through Yips brother in Hong Kong found entry to be smooth and easy. For these Chinese, Yip On did not even translate British Canadian officials questions, and he lent them show money to prove their bona fides as good immigrants.79 Other Chinese faced more prolonged investigations of their class status and identities. In 1908, Lum Ching Ling, an English-speaker and twenty-nineyear resident of British Columbia, returned to Canada after a visit to China. Yip and Lum knew each other, but Yip denied all evidence of Lums merchant 24
status and naturalized citizenship. Yip On detained Lum until he paid the $500 Chinese head tax as if he were a newly arrived Chinese laborer.80 Like Lum, a great many Chinese returning from visits to China struggled to prove their identities. Most Chinese had even more difficulties returning because, unlike Lum, they did not speak English well. No Anglo immigration officials could speak or read Chinese. The language barrier made it especially difficult for Chinese Canadians to prove their previous residence.81 Historian Edgar Wickberg described their dilemma: Many Chinese were semiliterate in English, had never standardized Romanized equivalents of their Chinese names, and were easily confused and intimidated by the situation. As if that were not enough, the names of the Blue Funnel steamships on which many Chinese came to Canada (some examples are: Philoctetes and Protesalaeus) seemed to be fiendishly designed to defeat comprehension in memory of both Chinese passenger and immigration agent.82 One Chinese detainee in Victoria carved his anguish into the detention sheds wall in 1919: When I think of the foreign barbarians, my anger will rise sky high. They put me in jail and make me suffer this misery. I moan until the early dawn. But who will console me here?83 Ensnared in the head taxs bureaucratic maze, they hoped that the official interpreter would help free themor at least not hinder them.

arranged for a Chinese passport stating that Mak was a rice merchant, and the British consul approved his claim to Canadian status as a head-tax-exempt merchant. When Canadian officials in Vancouver questioned him without Yip Ons expected aid, Mak cracked under the pressure. He admitted that his father was a Chinese laundryman in Philadelphia, which was his most likely destination.105 Mak had bought his papers and steamship ticket through one of the many Hong Kong emigration firms active in Guangdongs Pearl River Delta. Yip Ons brother operated one of these firms. Yip Yen sold CPR tickets, arranged immigration to the Americas, handled immigrants banking, and conducted transpacific trade.106 The presence of his famous brother, Yip On, as Vancouvers interpreter, would have helped sales considerably. To Yip On and David Lew, the interpreter post was more than a job: the victor could partly control and channel the profits of Chinese migration.
Gatekeepers Who Left the Door Ajar
As Yip On discovered, Canadian officials procedures made head tax evasion through impersonation simple. Chinese immigrants could easily memorize a coaching book of right answers to the standard questionnaire. Most false papers came with these coaching books, along with contracts that required immigrants to maintain a consistent appearance of belonging to their paper family.107 According to the records of Canadas Department of Trade, which administered the Chinese head tax as part of its customs mandate from 1885 to 1911, officials judged whether merchant status was warranted through a two-step process.108 The first step examined the prospective merchants documentation. Before 1907, Canadas officials depended on British consular affidavits. Agents of the Yip family then began to sell genuine Chinese viceroy of Liangguang passports that certified Chinese merchant status. Emigrants purchased these passports, obtained Canadian visas from the British consul in Hong Kong, and then entered Canada under aliases.109 In Guangdong, China, a network of local brokers affiliated with the Yip family marketed these immigration packages in Taishan Countys cities, towns, and villages and in Guangzhou.110 For example, Ng Yik met a scholar outside the Liangguang viceroys court. For Mex$90, the scholar arranged for a merchant passport that certified Ng exempt from the head tax.111 At first, Canadian customs officials were surprised that merchant immigrants arrived with only Chinese-language documentation of their status.112 In 1908, Vancouver customs collector J. M. Bowell consulted his superior in Ottawa, immigration controller Francis C. T. OHara. OHara concluded that the Chinese 28
passports, which no Anglo official could read, were sufficient proof. To maintain Bowells cooperation, Canadas cabinet subsequently voted to raise his annual salary from $400 to $700, despite the fact that he was the son of a former Conservative Party prime minister.113 The raise indicated that backers of illegal immigration had substantial influence within the Liberal Party. The second step in judging Chinese merchants claims, the interviews, also left ample room for officials interpretation. Canadian officials used standard questionnaires to ask simple questions about entrants business activities. The form that recorded their answers had room for only cursory replies.114 Officials also examined each entrants appearance, clothing, hands, and intonation for clues to his class status.115 The entrant also had to display sufficient cash and credit to convince officials that he could start a business in Canada. Fathers and sons had to give the same answers to a standard questionnaire about their family in order to share a head tax exemption. Officials also asked fathers to pick their sons out of a group of boys.116 Returning Chinese had to match answers to questionnaires filled out at the time of their departure. Their height, weight, and identifying marks also had to be similar to their exit certificate.117 The increasing standardization of Canadas head tax system paralleled trends in the United States enforcement of its Chinese exclusion law.118 However, Canadas system diverged from the U.S. model because the ruling parties did not attempt to create a strong Chinese immigration system. They did not hire full-time Chinese interpreters. Frontline Anglo officials were also part time; they devoted most of their time to handling customs.119 In addition, the Canadian government relied on the CPR for Vancouvers Chinese detention shed until 1914 or 1915, allowing the CPRs Chinese ticket agents free access to all detainees.120 The simple, underfunded system prompted Anglo officials to rely on Chinese interpreters judgments. As a result, politically appointed interpreters became the head taxs de facto chief gatekeepers.

Chinese Board of Trade, the Chinese consul, the president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the president of the Chinese Citizens Association, Edward Foster, Won Alexander Cumyow, a stenographer, the general Vancouver CPR passenger agent, and a CPR attorney.193 Yips supporters hired an Anglo lawyer, S. S. Taylor, and three Chinese Canadian interpreters to help the Chinese merchants counter Lews accusations of immigration fraud.194 Lew refused to be intimidated when he conducted the Chinese passengers interviews. He immediately moved beyond the governments short standard questionnaire, exposing its inadequacy. He probed every story, displaying the virtuosity of a trial lawyer as each mans case crumbled into inconsistencies, evasions, and lies. Lews discoveries strengthened his claim that the head tax system should be based on truth rather than farce. The merchant candidates, all men from Taishan County, Guangdong, in Siyi, brought with them Chinese viceroys passports and invalid drafts for cash to be drawn from local Chinese firms as proof of their merchant status.195 For example, Chung Kwong, twenty-six, of Tai Shee Wo, Taishan, claimed to be a merchant from Kong Moon City in Xinhui. Under questioning from Lew, he admitted that he did not know Kong Moon well. He could not recall any firms, people, or steamers there. When immigration officials searched his luggage, they found many white cloth coats of the type worn by cooks.196 The men admitted that local gentry in their villages and towns had helped them to obtain viceroys passports, get British consul visas, and obtain their steamship tickets. Many had purchased their CPR tickets through the Chung Hing Company, probably an affiliate of Yip Yens emigration business in Hong Kong. Chung also carried a letter from Yin Lung Tong, stating that he and eleven or twelve other passengers from Fong Kin Shows place were guaranteed passage. The letter included the statement, I received from Fong 30 small gold pieces, bade me when landed to hand to interpreter for his own use. Fong has a letter for each individual to bring along to be handed to Yip Ting Sam.197 Yip Ting Sam was another name for Yip On.198 These interviews proved extremely damaging to Yip; the power struggle within the Liberal Party over which faction would prevail intensified. Victories and losses for both sides rapidly followed, showing the fluid nature of each Chinese-British factions political influence. Shortly after Yips dismissal, party leader Robert Kelly convened a meeting of the local Liberal Party executive in Vancouver to address Lews accusations of political corruption. Fearing discovery of their own involvement, the Liberal executive complained that its prerogative to advise on appointments in Vancouver had been overridden. Moreover, it claimed that Lew was dishonest. Members 38

Lews allies also benefited. In 1916, Tom McInnes realized his dream of a business in China, most likely due to the influence of Lew and his backers. He met with Chinas Dr. Sun Yat Sen, then won a concession to build Guangzhous streetcar system. Between 1916 and 1924, McInnes lived in Guangzhou, supervising the demolition of the citys ancient walls and the construction of the streetcar lines.262 In 1917, Lews ally J. W. de B. Farris was elected to the provincial legislature and eventually served as the provinces attorney general.263 Yip Ons side sustained the greater loss. Facing criminal charges, Yip fled to China, toppling from the peak of Chinese Canadian power into obscurity.264 The Liberal Party cut off Kellys political machine from patronage, ending its influence.265 Despite the setbacks, the Yip family continued to build a fortune through its brokerage talents. Yip Sang had established his Wing Sang Company as Chinese Canadas premier brokerage firm. His network of younger relatives and his twenty-three children ensured that members of the Yip family would have dominant broker roles. The Conservative victory in the 1911 election ended fifteen years of Liberal Party rule, but the Yips influence persisted.266 By 1916, Yip Sangs son Yip Kew Him had become Vancouvers Chinese immigration and CPR interpreter, a position he held until at least 1941, lasting through Conservative, Unionist, and Liberal governments. After Yip Sang passed away in 1927, his son Yip Kew Mow (Ye Qiu Mao) became the family patriarch. Yip Kew Mow continued the familys Liberal Party ties, attending a Vancouver Board of Trade dinner for Prime Minister William L. Mackenzie King in 1929.267 Yip Ons fall rippled across the forty-ninth parallel: the United States quietly ended Vancouvers monopoly on issuing Chinese merchant certificates. From that point, Chinese Canadians could apply at Vancouver, Victoria, or Ottawa for documentation of their class-exempt status from the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act.268 But the connected Chinese population of Mexico continued to seek admission to the United States via similar merchant certificates and appeared to practice some parallel forms of political brokerage.269 The preceding analysis of the Yip-Lew conflict thus suggests new ways of reading Chinese migrants resistance and collaboration within the settlement nations of the Pacific world.

The company had built a gated Chinatown, and it exercised great control over Chinese jobs, housing, and gambling services.102 Lew helped to establish a rival enterprise and used his own money to make loans for Chinese illegal immigrants passage. The illegal immigrants worked for Lews labor contracting firm, lived at his boardinghouse, gambled at his gambling club, and bought supplies at his company store until they paid off their debts. The Lun Yick Company did not want a rival, and it harassed Lews firm. It built a house that blocked his front door until Lew persuaded the city of Nanaimo that his property was on a public road, which forced the houses removal. The Lun Yick Company had Lew arrested in 1922 on trumped-up charges that he had removed a surveyors post.103 Lew was acquitted in 1923 and countersued his opponents for false testimony and malicious prosecution. A jury awarded Lew an immense $10,000 settlement against Wing Lee (Rong Li), the Lun Yick Companys president. Canadas supreme court planned to hear the case only weeks before Lews death. The chance that Wing might lose to Lew on appeal was one possible motive for the killing.104 By the summer of 1924, it appeared that Lews probable alliance with the provincial Liberal government had ended. He hired a spy to infiltrate a Chinese Freemason bootlegging operation whose exposure would have damaged the ruling provincial Liberal Party. His espionage targeted an unnamed Chinese liquor store owner who was the powerful concubine of an unnamed wealthy Chinese Freemason leader. The Vancouver Daily Province described this leader as an influential old tyee, a Chinook term which referred to a respected Chinese chief.105 The infiltration of the Chinese womans liquor business, which involved either false or stolen British Columbia Liquor Control Board seals on the bottles of alcohol, coincided with a wider public scandal over bootlegging.106 This scandal involved allegations of patronage, corruption, and graft at the Liquor Control Board.107 From mid-June 1924 through 20 September 1924, Lew and his allies taunted their opponents in a signed front-page Da Han Gong Bao advertisement stating that the city of Vancouver had snared the womans Canadian Oriental Wine and Liquor Company for illegally selling alcohol without paying the proper taxes.108 Vancouver city officials penalized the Chinese liquor store owners business. However, she appeared to have powerful protectors; police declined to arrest her until four months later, on the night of Lews death.109 The contradictory pattern of eventsofficial action but police delaysuggests there was a power struggle among Chinese for influence with Vancouvers authorities. Chinese merchant factions in the Freemasons and Yue Shan also clashed over the control of illegal immigration to the United States. In 1920, Sanyi and Siyi competed for the CPRs favor, seeking to secure the lucrative 64
position of Hong Kong ticket agent. The CPR awarded the position to Sanyi Lee Mongkow, taking it away from Siyi Yip family businesses. The Hong Kong ticket agent sold steamship and rail tickets to Chinese passengers traveling to Canada, the United States, and the rest of the Americas. By the interwar era, many settlement nations in the Americas had implemented anti-Chinese immigration policies, ranging from exclusion laws to informal deterrence. The global creation of barriers to Chinese migration meant that the CPRs continued profits increasingly depended on Chinese Pacific world political networks. The continuity of Chinese migration in the Exclusion Era involved more than economic or cultural factors. It depended on political initiatives by Chinese resident in the Americas. Their political alliances at ports and borders made Chinese migrations possible. Presumably, the CPR judged Lews faction as being better able to deliver the political goods. Lee retired from his post as Victorias official Chinese immigration interpreter, and he returned to Hong Kong to set up his CPR ticket agent business, which Chinese on both sides of the forty-ninth parallel regarded as a most desirable commercial position.110 Shortly afterward, David Lew began work as the official immigration interpreter at Victoria, screening Chinese entering Canada and the United States. Given the unsettled situation for Chinese in Canada and abroad, Lews faction moved quickly to consolidate its position as a premier legal broker. It targeted a faction of Chinese Canadian businesspeople within the Chinese Freemasons. While working as an immigration interpreter, Lew gathered evidence of a Chinese human-smuggling ring that made huge profits through the evasion of Canadian and U.S. immigration laws. Lew then revealed his findings to U.S. immigration authorities, enabling them to crack down on the ring in the United States. As a result, federal authorities arrested David C. Kerr, the U.S. vice consul in Vancouver, for accepting bribes from Chinese in Canada to evade the U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act through fraudulent entry as students and merchants.111 Lew also attempted to expose the smuggling rings involvement in the Chinese slave girl traffic. Lew claimed that a ring of Chinese businesspeople in larger Pacific Coast cities of both Canada and the United States had organized this illegal sex-trafficking scheme.112 Lew told his Anglo lawyer friends that these businesspeople would kill him if he revealed his discoveries to the Canadian authorities.113 If Lews revelations about Chinese prostitution had become widely known, there would have been Anglo outrage, fueled as much by antiChinese sentiment as the truth about forced Chinese female immigration.114 Such a public uproar might have forced authorities to back off from their protection of Lews rivals.

when they attempted to move beyond the margins. In addition to Vancouvers two anti-Asian riots, violence often happened between Chinese and white individuals, even among children in the public schools.78 Chinese Canadians in Vancouver also mobilized to support the antisegregation movement through the popular culture of Chinas anti-colonial nationalism. In February 1923, Chinese students in Vancouver performed a fundraising play written in baihua, vernacular spoken Chinese. The students titled their play Virtuous Women Avenge a Grievance (Lie Nu Bao Jiao Chou).79 Other Vancouver Chinese groups also performed plays to support the boycott. In March 1923, Da Han Gong Bao reviewed one fundraising theater performance, a new Chinese drama to help education in the new world society of the homeland. This great play, wrote the paper, told the story of a young concubines son in love.80 Vancouver Chinese-language school students also performed a fundraising baihua play, Man in Black (Hei Yi Ren) in Cantonese.81 At the performance, over 200 Chinese households and firms donated funds to fight school segregation.82 At a second Victoria mass meeting at a white peoples theater in November 1922, school boycott organizers again framed the school protest as a vital struggle against a rising anti-Asian movement in Canada. Meeting chair Ma Yu Ru addressed an audience of thousands. If Chinese permitted school segregation to be expanded, every class of overseas Chinese would face diminished future opportunity. The public schools produced most brokers and community leaders. He urged Chinese to defend their freedoms in Canada and to resist segregation in the name of Chinas national honor. Joe Hope pleaded for unity, claiming that only a show of strength would force Victorias school board to back down.83 A white lawyer informed the crowd that Canadas Parliament was considering a proposal to end Chinese immigration.84 The anti-segregation movement brought together international ideas about revolution with the local politics of school protest, so ties to the Pacific world added more than diplomatic pressure; they also contributed to the anti-segregation movements ideas.
The Anti-Segregation Movement Spreads to Vancouver: Brokerage Politics in Regional and International Perspective
Vancouver Chinese power brokers formed the Anti-Segregation Support Association, led by Chinese Benevolent Association (CBA) leaders who had halted Vancouvers earlier attempt to expand school segregation.85 On

college-educated, American-born Chinese.94 As in Canada, almost all ordinary Chinese Americans refused to speak with the survey researchers. Both Chinese Canadians and Chinese Americans testimony steered researchers away from the open-ended world of Chinese Diaspora migrations. Rather than the back and forth of global migrations, brokers argued that their lives demonstrated a propensity toward settlement in their new nations. In actuality, Chinese of all generations had transnational ties. Chinese interviewees attributed their persistent homeland ties to the distorting effects of white prejudice, declining to disclose fully their generations of transnational family life. Seattle businessman Pany Lowe described himself as a spurned second-generation Chinese American. Me being citizen I vote in all election. Sure I vote every time I get chance. When I young fellow I felt that I American. I no Chinaman. Now I get more sense. I know I never be American, always Chinaman. I no care now anymore.95 Lowes personal loss of faith in America added credibility to his claims that white prejudice caused Chinese tongs and illegal immigration. Rather than seeing an international migrant group with a flexible sense of national destiny, which would have described more than a third of all Canadian residents, the survey researchers saw Chinese in terms that did not fundamentally question the permanent-settlement ideal.96
Performing Political Power
Brokers had much to gain by disavowing foreign ties, especially in British Columbia. There, the surveys Anglo supporters added an extra question to the study: they wanted to know Chinese Canadians fitness for democracy.97 Canadian voters had long regarded Chinese political participation as undesirable, so judges routinely restricted Chinese access to naturalization.98 Canadas Parliament reaffirmed in 1919 that British Columbia could continue to disenfranchise Asian Canadians, a category that included the Canadian-born, naturalized immigrants and British subjects from elsewhere in the Empire.99 The 1923 act harshly restricted Chinese immigrants political freedoms: involvement in Chinas revolutionary politics would lead to deportation.100 At the time, Chinese Canadians of all generations had relatives in China, so most felt homeland politics to be a right and a duty. Beijing did not control Guangdong province, where Dr. Sun Yat Sen was raising a revolutionary army to restore his shattered country.101 However, to many British Canadians, Chinas revolutionary politics, from Nationalism to Communism, 100
sounded subversive, especially as the politics of Suns Nationalist revolution directly challenged the British Empires interests in China.102 To the survey researchers, Chinese Canadians described themselves as passive recipients of Canadian influence rather than as active shapers of Canadas and Chinas destiny. Tom Whauns comments exemplified the strategy. He defended Chinas people power as Chinese Canadians only means of leveling the political playing field. The 1923 Chinese Immigration Acts denial of British freedoms provoked Whaun to mount a national letter-writing campaign.103 On 23 June 1923, the Vancouver Sun and the Daily Province printed Whauns warning: If we cannot stop your discriminative and anti-racial laws against us here, we can retaliate in many ways. The consequences of your unjust treatment will reverberate throughout China in the form of boycott against British and Canadian goods.104 Whaun also privately urged Lord Byng, the governor general of Canada, to modify the act.105 To the surveys researchers, Whaun defended his politics by claiming that Canadas racial injustice jarred him out of his natural Britishness.106 In contrast, to Chinese Canadian audiences, Whaun stated that he emigrated to Canada to acquire a modern education, determined to do or die for New China that would again command respect from all.107 He said to Raushenbush: I never belonged to any Chinese organizations until recently. But when this bill appeared I wrote a letter about it that was translated in all the Chinese papers. This is too much. What can they do? They cant put us all on a boat and dump us into the ocean.108 His direct appeal to the Canadian public failed, leaving him angry and disillusioned, but Chinas support provided a ray of hope. Newspapers in China printed his letter and encouraged Chinese citizens to boycott Canadian goods.109 Whaun warned that Chinas people could compel the respect that was their due: Well have armies and navies too, if we have to, and well take what is ours. Do they think they can take all the land of the earth? I guess we can take it too. And we will. Why half of the Chinese here have got a picture of Jack Dempsey on their walls, and were ready to show them.110

notes to pages 9496

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

95. 96.

Guy Funn Chan to Thomas Moore Whaun, 5, 14 Oct. 1916, box 1, Whaun Papers. Whaun, An Autobiographical Sketch, 1. Raushenbush, Visit: Home of Mr. [Ko] Wing Kan, 20 Feb. 1924, box 24, file 24-13, SRR. Raushenbush, Interview, Herbert Wang. Raushenbush, Interview with Mr. [Tom] Moore Whaun. Huang, Gender, Race, and Power, 4856. Raushenbush, BC Major Documents. DHGB, 19, 27 Sept.; 2,3,4,6,11,21,22,23 November 1922; 3,Jan.; 22 Feb 1923; 14 Feb. 1924. Jiangxia Tang Huan Yan Huang Song Mao Xue Shi, ca. 1921. Box 1, Whaun Papers. Raushenbush, Interview with Mr. Moore Whaun. Ibid. Raushenbush, Call, T. M. Whaun, 5 Mar. 1924, box 24, file 24-17, SRR. Raushenbush, Interview Gershon Lew, the Hottest Bolshevik in Vancouver, May 1924; Mr. Thomas Moore Whaun Audience, 3. Raushenbush, Interview with Harry Hastings, draft version, 56. He was probably referring to Marcus Aurelius, not Antonius. The former was a Stoic philosopher-emperor famous for his Meditations. The latter is better known as Mark Antony, Caesars friend and a member of the second triumvirate, who was no philosopher and left no writings. Raushenbush, Call T. M. Whaun, 5. Raushenbush, Mr. Thomas Moore Whaun Audience, 3. Raushenbush, Call T. M. Whaun, 1. Raushenbush, Visit Home of Mr. Ko Wing Kan, 1. Raushenbush, interview with Cecil Lee, 4. Raushenbush, Visit the Lam family. Raushenbush, Interview with Cecil Lee, 45. Raushenbush, Luncheon, Miss Hosang. Raushenbush, Interview: Herbert Wang, 14. Ibid. Raushenbush, Visit, the old mens home, 16. Raushenbush, Interview with Lew Shong Kow, ex-president of the Chinese Empire Reform Association, 30 Jan. 1924, 4. box 24, file 24-1, SRR. Raushenbush, Interview, Herbert Wang, 22 Feb. 1924, 5. Raushenbush, Interview with Cecil Lee, 3. C. H. Burnett, box 27, folders 18, 27, 3334, 3650, SRR; Interview with Esther Wong, 1 July 1924, SRR; Raushenbush, Great Wall of Chinatown, 154158, 221. C. H. Burnett, Interview of Pany Lowe, 5 July 1924, 4, box 28, file 28-242, SRR. Hansen, Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples, 263. Park and his associates concluded that Asians experience on the Pacific Coast could be described

notes to pages 96100

97. 98.
99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116.

notes to pages 112114

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

36. 37. 38. 39.

of the Canadian Council of Christians and Jews, Minutes of Meeting, 21 Feb. 1960, box 4, Wong Papers. Foon Sien Wongs Goal for 1959, an unidentified news clipping, shows that Canada censored Chinese Canadian media and communications through established Chinese community leaders like Wong, who censored for the national War Services Department between 1939 and 1945. Osborne, Unwanted Soldiers; Chan, Gold Mountain, 144, 146; Con et al., From China to Canada, 200. Yee and Roy briefly note the conflict over military service. Chan also notes that 8,000 men were of eligible age, but only about 500 served (144). Some works, such as Unwanted Soldiers, have focused most on the Chinese who chose to serve with no guarantees of equal rights. Yee, Roy, Maxwell, and Mar note the conflict, but a more complete story of Chinese Canadians resistance to military service remains to be written. Roy, The Triumph of Citizenship, 154155; Mar, From Diaspora to North American Civil Rights, 218224; Maxwell, A Cause Worth Fighting For, 3839; Veterans Affairs Canada, Heroes Remember: Chinese-Canadian Veterans, http://www.vacacc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=collections/hr_cdnchinese (accessed 16 Feb. 2009); Osborne, Unwanted Soldiers. This is the main argument in K. Scott Wongs Americans First. Anderson, Vancouvers Chinatown, 172; Roy, The Triumph of Citizenship, 151 152; Yung, Unbound Feet, 260270; Wong, Americans First, 4654. DHGB, 15 July 1943. Ibid., 10, 12, 13 July 1943. Keshen, Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers, 311. I have located only two monograph-length studies of China-Canada relations: Ren, Canadian Trade Commissioners in Shanghai; Song and Dong, Zhongguo yu Jianada: Zhong Jia Guanxi de Lishi Huigu. These figures are derived from the following: a definition of a Canadian as either a resident or a British subject born in Canada; 9 percent of Canadian residents were born outside of the British Empire; and 9 percent of the global Canadian-born population lived in the United States. Eighth Census of Canada, 1941, 3:258; Vedder and Gallaway, Settlement Patterns of Canadian Immigrants, 77. DHGB, 24, 30 Nov. 1939. Avison, American Dollars Are Hard to Get, 116; Powell, A History of the Canadian Dollar, 5355. Hansen, Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples, 1:263. Whynot, Old Stamping Grounds, 4, 34; Azzi, Walter Gordon, 20; DHGB, 24, 30 Nov. 1939, 13 July 1943. Many Chinese immigrants had been sending remittances through Chinese remittance shops, which were part of the commerce of transnational migration. See Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home, 3440. This pattern had analogues in other immigrant groups, such as the Italians. See Harney, Commerce of Migration and The Padrone and the Immigrant.

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