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SMS GupShup Enterprise Edition

Mobile Access

2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 1
SMS GupShup Mobile Access

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....4 ENABLING MOBILE ACCESS VIA WEBSITE....5 MOBILE ACCESS FOR GROUP CREATION....6 SMS ACCESS.....7 POST ON THE GROUP.....7 LIST GROUPS.....8 CREATE NEW GROUP.....8 ADD NUMBERS TO A GROUP.....8 DELETE NUMBERS FROM A GROUP....9 LIST MASKS VALID FOR A GROUP....9 POST A MESSAGE TO AN INDIVIDUAL NUMBER....9 POST A MESSAGE TO MULTIPLE NUMBERS....10
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Table of Figures

FIGURE 1......5 FIGURE 2......6 FIGURE 3......6 FIGURE 4......7 FIGURE 5......7 FIGURE 6......8 FIGURE 7......8 FIGURE 8......8 FIGURE 9......9 FIGURE 10.....9 FIGURE 11.....9 FIGURE 12.....10
2009 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 3

1 Introduction

This document is to be read in conjunction with the SMS GupShup Enterprise document.
Mobile access will allow you to access your groups through the specified mobile phone(s). You can create new groups too through the specified mobile phone(s).
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 4
2 Enabling Mobile Access via website
Log into your account on http://enterprise.smsgupshup.com. After logging in, click on the Groups tab. Click on the group settings tab for the group for which you want to enable mobile access. Check the enable option.
Figure 1 Setting up mobile access for group via website After enabling mobile access, a successful message is displayed. You need to now add the mobile number to which you need to provide access to the group(s). You can add upto 7 different mobile numbers that can have this functionality.
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 5
Figure 2 Enabling Mobile Access for group Test1
Mobile access for group creation.
You can now create groups through the mobile phone. To enable this feature, click on Settings on the top bar.
Figure 3 Enabling Mobile Access for Group Creation Check Advanced Settings option on this page. Check the enable option for group creation by SMS. Add the mobile number on which you want provide this feature. You can add upto 7 different mobile numbers which will be able to create groups under your account.
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 6
Figure 4 Enabling Mobile Access for Group Creation

3 SMS Access

Once mobile access is enabled for a particular group, the following actions can be performed 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Post on the group List groups Create new group Add numbers to a group Delete numbers from a group List masks valid for a group Post a message to an individual number Post a message to multiple numbers NOTE: All SMS commands through the mobile phone must be sent to 567678080 or 9220092200

Post to a group

To post on the group, SMS POST <space> GROUPNAME <space> MESSAGE to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 5 Posting on a Group through Mobile Phone NOTE: If you are posting using a CDMA mobile phones (Reliance/TATA) the maximum length of message is 135 characters. If you are posting via GSM mobile phones maximum length is 300 characters.
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 7

List groups

This will enable you to see all enabled groups for your mobile number under your account. To see the list, SMS GROUPS to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 6 Listing Mobile Access Enabled Groups

Create new group

If group creation is enabled for your mobile number, you can create a group by sending CREATE <space> GROUPNAME <space> MASK to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 7 Creating Group through Mobile Phone

Add numbers to a group

You can add mobile numbers to a group to which you have mobile access, by sending ADD <space> GROUPNAME <space> Number1 <space> Number2 <space>. NumberN to 567678080 or 9220092200. Please note that the mobile numbers must be Indian.

Figure 8 Adding Numbers to a Group through Mobile Phone
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 8
Delete numbers from a group
You can delete mobile numbers from a group to which you have mobile access, by sending DEL <space> GROUPNAME <space> Number1 <space> Number2 <space> NumberN to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 9 Deleting Numbers from a Group through Mobile Phone
List masks valid for a group
You can see all valid masks for groups enabled on your mobile phone by sending MASKS to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 10 Listing Masks for Mobile Access Enabled Groups
Post a message to an individual number
You can post a message to a single number by sending POST <space> NUMBER <space> MESSAGE to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 11 Posting message to a single number from mobile phone
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 9
Post a message to multiple numbers
You can post a message to multiple numbers by sending POST <space> Number1 <space> Number2 <space> NumberN <space> Message to 567678080 or 9220092200
Figure 12 Posting message to multiple numbers from Mobile Phone
Note:You can also get Help on your mobile by sending HELP to 567678080
2010 Webaroo Technology India Pvt. Ltd. Confidential and Proprietary. All rights reserved. 10

WS-SecureConversation 1.3
OASIS Standard 1 March 2007
Artifact Identifier: ws-secureconversation-1.3-os Location: This Version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/ws-secureconversation-1.3os.doc http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/ws-secureconversation-1.3os.pdf http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/ws-secureconversation-1.3os.html Previous Version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/ws-secureconversation-1.3spec-cs-01.doc http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/ws-secureconversation-1.3spec-cs-01.pdf http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/ws-secureconversation-1.3spec-cs-01.html Latest Version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/v1.3/ws-secureconversation.doc http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/v1.3/ws-secureconversation.pdf http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/v1.3/ws-secureconversation.html Technical Committee: OASIS Web Services Secure Exchange TC Chair(s): Kelvin Lawrence, IBM Chris Kaler, Microsoft Editor(s): Anthony Nadalin, IBM Marc Goodner, Microsoft Martin Gudgin, Microsoft Abbie Barbir, Nortel Hans Granqvist, VeriSign Related work: NA Declared XML namespace(s): http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512 Abstract: This specification defines extensions that build on [WS-Security] to provide a framework for requesting and issuing security tokens, and to broker trust relationships.
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Status: This document was last revised or approved by the WS-SX TC on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the current location noted above for possible later revisions of this document. This document is updated periodically on no particular schedule. Technical Committee members should send comments on this specification to the Technical Committees email list. Others should send comments to the Technical Committee by using the Send A Comment button on the Technical Committees web page at http://www.oasisopen.org/committees/ws-sx. For information on whether any patents have been disclosed that may be essential to implementing this specification, and any offers of patent licensing terms, please refer to the Intellectual Property Rights section of the Technical Committee web page (http://www.oasisopen.org/committees/ws-sx/ipr.php. The non-normative errata page for this specification is located at http://www.oasisopen.org/committees/ws-sx.
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1 March 2007 Page 2 of 40

Notices

Copyright OASIS 19932007. All Rights Reserved. OASIS trademark, IPR and other policies apply. All capitalized terms in the following text have the meanings assigned to them in the OASIS Intellectual Property Rights Policy (the "OASIS IPR Policy"). The full Policy may be found at the OASIS website. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published, and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this section are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, including by removing the copyright notice or references to OASIS, except as needed for the purpose of developing any document or deliverable produced by an OASIS Technical Committee (in which case the rules applicable to copyrights, as set forth in the OASIS IPR Policy, must be followed) or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by OASIS or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and OASIS DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY OWNERSHIP RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. OASIS requests that any OASIS Party or any other party that believes it has patent claims that would necessarily be infringed by implementations of this OASIS Committee Specification or OASIS Standard, to notify OASIS TC Administrator and provide an indication of its willingness to grant patent licenses to such patent claims in a manner consistent with the IPR Mode of the OASIS Technical Committee that produced this specification. OASIS invites any party to contact the OASIS TC Administrator if it is aware of a claim of ownership of any patent claims that would necessarily be infringed by implementations of this specification by a patent holder that is not willing to provide a license to such patent claims in a manner consistent with the IPR Mode of the OASIS Technical Committee that produced this specification. OASIS may include such claims on its website, but disclaims any obligation to do so. OASIS takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on OASIS' procedures with respect to rights in any document or deliverable produced by an OASIS Technical Committee can be found on the OASIS website. Copies of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this OASIS Committee Specification or OASIS Standard, can be obtained from the OASIS TC Administrator. OASIS makes no representation that any information or list of intellectual property rights will at any time be complete, or that any claims in such list are, in fact, Essential Claims. The name "OASIS" is a trademark of OASIS, the owner and developer of this specification, and should be used only to refer to the organization and its official outputs. OASIS welcomes reference to, and implementation and use of, specifications, while reserving the right to enforce its marks against misleading uses. Please see http://www.oasis-open.org/who/trademark.php for above guidance.

Claim A claim is a statement made about a client, service or other resource (e.g. name, identity, key, group, privilege, capability, etc.). Security Token A security token represents a collection of claims. Security Context A security context is an abstract concept that refers to an established authentication state and negotiated key(s) that may have additional security-related properties. Security Context Token A security context token (SCT) is a wire representation of that security context abstract concept, which allows a context to be named by a URI and used with [WS-Security]. Signed Security Token A signed security token is a security token that is asserted and cryptographically endorsed by a specific authority (e.g. an X.509 certificate or a Kerberos ticket).
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Proof-of-Possession Token A proof-of-possession (POP) token is a security token that contains secret data that can be used to demonstrate authorized use of an associated security token. Typically, although not exclusively, the proof-of-possession information is encrypted with a key known only to the recipient of the POP token. Digest A digest is a cryptographic checksum of an octet stream. Signature - A signature [XML-Signature] is a value computed with a cryptographic algorithm and bound to data in such a way that intended recipients of the data can use the signature to verify that the data has not been altered and/or has originated from the signer of the message, providing message integrity and authentication. The signature can be computed and verified with symmetric key algorithms, where the same key is used for signing and verifying, or with asymmetric key algorithms, where different keys are used for signing and verifying (a private and public key pair are used). Security Token Service - A security token service (STS) is a Web service that issues security tokens (see [WS-Security]). That is, it makes assertions based on evidence that it trusts, to whoever trusts it (or to specific recipients). To communicate trust, a service requires proof, such as a signature, to prove knowledge of a security token or set of security token. A service itself can generate tokens or it can rely on a separate STS to issue a security token with its own trust statement (note that for some security token formats this can just be a re-issuance or co-signature). This forms the basis of trust brokering. Request Security Token (RST) A RST is a message sent to a security token service to request a security token. Request Security Token Response (RSTR) A RSTR is a response to a request for a security token. In many cases this is a direct response from a security token service to a requestor after receiving an RST message. However, in multi-exchange scenarios the requestor and security token service may exchange multiple RSTR messages before the security token service issues a final RSTR message. One or more RSTRs are contained within a single RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection (RSTRC).

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This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional attributes, based on schemas, to be added to the element. /wsc:SecurityContextToken/{any} This is an extensibility mechanism to allow additional elements (arbitrary content) to be used. The <wsc:SecurityContextToken> token elements MUST be preserved. That is, whatever elements contained within the tag on creation MUST be preserved wherever the token is used. A consumer of a <wsc:SecurityContextToken> token MAY extend the token by appending information. Consequently producers of <wsc:SecurityContextToken> tokens should consider this fact when processing previously generated tokens. A service consuming (processing) a <wsc:SecurityContextToken> token MAY fault if it discovers an element or attribute inside the token that it doesn't understand, or it MAY ignore it. The fault code wsc:UnsupportedContextToken is RECOMMENDED if a fault is raised. The behavior is specified by the services policy [WS-Policy] [WSPolicyAttachment]. Care should be taken when adding information to tokens to ensure that relying parties can ensure the information has not been altered since the SCT definition does not require a specific way to secure its contents (which as noted above can be appended to). Security contexts, like all security tokens, can be referenced using the mechanisms described in [WSSecurity] (the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element referencing the wsu:Id attribute relative to the XML base document or referencing using the <wsc:Identifier> element's absolute URI). When a token is referenced, the associated key is used. If a token provides multiple keys then specific bindings and profiles must describe how to reference the separate keys. If a specific key instance needs to be referenced, then the global attribute wsc:Instance is included in the <wsse:Reference> sub-element (only when using <wsc:Identifier> references) of the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element as illustrated below:
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference xmlns:wsse="." xmlns:wsc="."> <wsse:Reference URI="uuid:. " wsc:Instance="."/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

The following sample message illustrates the use of a security context token. In this example a context has been established and the secret is known to both parties. This secret is used to sign the message body.
(001) <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> (002) <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="." xmlns:ds="." xmlns:wsse="." xmlns:wsu="." xmlns:wsc="."> (003) <S11:Header> (004). (005) <wsse:Security> (006) <wsc:SecurityContextToken wsu:Id="MyID"> (007) <wsc:Identifier>uuid:.</wsc:Identifier> (008) </wsc:SecurityContextToken> (009) <ds:Signature> (010). (011) <ds:KeyInfo> (012) <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> (013) <wsse:Reference URI="#MyID"/> (014) </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> (015) </ds:KeyInfo> (016) </ds:Signature> (017) </wsse:Security> (018) </S11:Header> (019) <S11:Body wsu:Id="MsgBody">
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<tru:StockSymbol xmlns:tru="http://fabrikam123.com/payloads"> QQQ </tru:StockSymbol> (021) </S11:Body> (022) </S11:Envelope>
Let's review some of the key sections of this example: Lines (003)-(018) contain the SOAP message headers. Lines (005)-(017) represent the <wsse:Security> header block. This contains the security-related information for the message. Lines (006)-(008) specify a security token that is associated with the message. In this case it is a security context token. Line (007) specifies the unique ID of the context. Lines (009)-(016) specify the digital signature. In this example, the signature is based on the security context (specifically the secret/key associated with the context). Line (010) represents the typical contents of an XML Digital Signature which, in this case, references the body and potentially some of the other headers expressed by line (004). Lines (012)-(014) indicate the key that was used for the signature. In this case, it is the security context token included in the message. Line (013) provides a URI link to the security context token specified in Lines (006)-(008). The body of the message is represented by lines (019)-(021).

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3 Establishing Security Contexts
A security context needs to be created and shared by the communicating parties before being used. This specification defines three different ways of establishing a security context among the parties of a secure communication. Security context token created by a security token service The context initiator asks a security token service to create a new security context token. The newly created security context token is distributed to the parties through the mechanisms defined here and in [WS-Trust]. For this scenario the initiating party sends a <wst:RequestSecurityToken> request to the token service and a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> containing a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> is returned. The response contains a <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> containing (or pointing to) the new security context token and a <wst:RequestedProofToken> pointing to the "secret" for the returned context. The requestor then uses the security context token (with [WS-Security]) when securing messages to applicable services. Security context token created by one of the communicating parties and propagated with a message The initiator creates a security context token and sends it to the other parties on a message using the mechanisms described in this specification and in [WS-Trust]. This model works when the sender is trusted to always create a new security context token. For this scenario the initiating party creates a security context token and issues a signed unsolicited <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> to the other party. The message contains a <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> containing (or pointing to) the new security context token and a <wst:RequestedProofToken> pointing to the "secret" for the security context token. The recipient can then choose whether or not to accept the security context token. As described in [WS-Trust], the <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> element MAY be in the <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> within a body or inside a header block. It should be noted that unless delegation tokens are used, this scenario requires that parties trust each other to share a secret key (and non-repudiation is probably not possible). As receipt of these messages may be expensive, and because a recipient may receive multiple messages, the /wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse/@Context attribute in [WS-Trust] allows the initiator to specify a URI to indicate the intended usage (allowing processing to be optimized). Security context token created through negotiation/exchanges When there is a need to negotiate or participate in a sequence of message exchanges among the participants on the contents of the security context token, such as the shared secret, this specification allows the parties to exchange data to establish a security context. For this scenario the initiating party sends a <wst:RequestSecurityToken> request to the other party and a <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> is returned. It is RECOMMENDED that the framework described in [WS-Trust] be used; however, the type of exchange will likely vary. If appropriate, the basic challenge-response definition in [WS-Trust] is RECOMMENDED. Ultimately (if successful), a final response contains a <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> containing (or pointing to) the new security context and a <wst:RequestedProofToken> pointing to the "secret" for the context. If an SCT is received, but the key sizes are not supported, then a fault SHOULD be generated using the wsc:UnsupportedContextToken fault code unless another more specific fault code is available.

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<ds:KeyInfo> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsse:Reference URI="#myToken"/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> </ds:KeyInfo> </ds:Signature> </wsse:Security>. </S11:Header> <S11:Body wsu:Id="req"> <wst:RequestSecurityToken> <wst:TokenType> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512/sct </wst:TokenType> <wst:RequestType> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue </wst:RequestType> </wst:RequestSecurityToken> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="." xmlns:wst="." xmlns:wsc="." xmlns:xenc="."> <S11:Header>. <wsa:Action xmlns:wsa="."> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/SCT </wsa:Action>. </S11:Header> <S11:Body> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wsc:SecurityContextToken> <wsc:Identifier>uuid:.</wsc:Identifier> </wsc:SecurityContextToken> </wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wst:RequestedProofToken> <xenc:EncryptedKey Id="newProof">. </xenc:EncryptedKey> </wst:RequestedProofToken> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>
3.3 SCT Request Example with Target Scope
There are scenarios where a security token service is used to broker trust using SCT tokens between requestors and Web Services endpoints. In these cases it is typical for requestors to identify the target Web Service in the RST. In the example below the requestor uses the element <wsp:AppliesTo> with an endpoint reference as described in [WS-Trust] in the SCT request to indicate the Web Service the token is needed for. In the request example below the <wst:TokenType> element is omitted. This requires that the security token service know what type of token the endpoint referenced in the <wsp:AppliesTo> element expects.
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="." xmlns:wsse="." xmlns:wsu="."
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xmlns:wst="." xmlns:xenc="." xmlns:wsp="." xmlns:wsa="."> <S11:Header>. <wsa:Action xmlns:wsa="."> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/SCT </wsa:Action>. <wsse:Security>. </wsse:Security>. </S11:Header> <S11:Body wsu:Id="req"> <wst:RequestSecurityToken> <wst:RequestType> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Issue </wst:RequestType> <wsp:AppliesTo> <wsa:EndpointReference> <wsa:Address>http://example.org/webservice</wsa:Address> </wsa:EndpointReference> </wsp:AppliesTo> </wst:RequestSecurityToken> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="." xmlns:wst="." xmlns:wsc="." xmlns:xenc="." xmlns:wsp="." xmlns:wsa="."> <S11:Header> <wsa:Action xmlns:wsa="."> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/SCT </wsa:Action>. </S11:Header> <S11:Body> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wsc:SecurityContextToken> <wsc:Identifier>uuid:.</wsc:Identifier> </wsc:SecurityContextToken> </wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wst:RequestedProofToken> <xenc:EncryptedKey Id="newProof">. </xenc:EncryptedKey> </wst:RequestedProofToken> <wsp:AppliesTo> <wsa:EndpointReference> <wsa:Address>http://example.org/webservice</wsa:Address> </wsa:EndpointReference> </wsp:AppliesTo> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>
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3.4 SCT Propagation Example
The following illustrates propagating a context to another party. This example does not contain any information regarding the Web Service the SCT is intended for (e.g. using the wsp:AppliesTo parameter in the RST).
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="." xmlns:wst="." xmlns:wsc="." xmlns:xenc="." > <S11:Header>. </S11:Header> <S11:Body> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wsc:SecurityContextToken> <wsc:Identifier>uuid:.</wsc:Identifier> </wsc:SecurityContextToken> </wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wst:RequestedProofToken> <xenc:EncryptedKey Id="newProof">. </xenc:EncryptedKey> </wst:RequestedProofToken> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>

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http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/Renew </wst:RequestType> <wst:RenewTarget> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsse:Reference URI="uuid:.UUID1."/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> </wst:RenewTarget> <wst:Lifetime>.</wst:Lifetime> </wst:RequestSecurityToken> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>
<S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="." xmlns:wst="." xmlns:wsc="."> <S11:Header>. <wsa:Action xmlns:wsa="."> http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/SCT/Renew </wsa:Action>. </S11:Header> <S11:Body> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> <wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> <wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wsc:SecurityContextToken> <wsc:Identifier>uuid:.UUID1.</wsc:Identifier> <wsc:Instance>UUID2</wsc:Instance> </wsc:SecurityContextToken> </wst:RequestedSecurityToken> <wst:Lifetime>.</wst:Lifetime> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponse> </wst:RequestSecurityTokenResponseCollection> </S11:Body> </S11:Envelope>
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6 Canceling Contexts
It is not uncommon for a requestor to be done with a security context token before it expires. In such cases the requestor can explicitly cancel the security context using this specialized binding based on the WS-Trust Cancel binding. The following Action URIs are used with this binding:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RST/SCT/Cancel http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/RSTR/SCT/Cancel
Once a security context has been cancelled it MUST NOT be allowed for authentication or authorization or allow renewal. Proof of possession of the key associated with the security context MUST be proven in order for security context to be cancelled. It is RECOMMENDED that this is done by creating a signature over the message body and key headers using the key associated with the security context. This binding uses the Cancel request type from WS-Trust. As described in WS-Trust the RSTR cancel message is informational and the context is cancelled once the cancel RST is processed even if the cancel RSTR is never received by the requestor. The following example illustrates canceling a context.

P_SHA1 (secret, label + seed)
At this point, both parties can use the P_SHA-1 function to generate shared keys as needed. For this protocol, we don't define explicit derivation uses. The <wsc:DerivedKeyToken> element is used to indicate that the key for a specific reference is generated from the function. This is so that explicit security tokens, secrets, or key material need not be exchanged as often thereby increasing efficiency and overall scalability. However, parties MUST
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mutually agree on specific derivations (e.g. the first 128 bits is the client's signature key, the next 128 bits in the client's encryption key, and so on). The policy presents a method for specifying this information. The RECOMMENDED approach is to use separate nonces and have independently generated keys for signing and encrypting in each direction. Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that new keys be derived for each message (i.e., previous nonces are not re-used). Once the parties determine a shared secret to use as the basis of a key generation sequence, an initial key is generated using this sequence. When a new key is required, a new <wsc:DerivedKeyToken> may be passed referencing the previously generated key. The recipient then knows to use the sequence to generate a new key, which will match that specified in the security token. If both parties pre-agree on key sequencing, then additional token exchanges are not required. For keys derived using a shared secret from a security context, the <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> element SHOULD be used to reference the <wsc:SecurityContextToken>. Basically, a signature or encryption references a <wsc:DerivedKeyToken> in the <wsse:Security> header that, in turn, references the <wsc:SecurityContextToken>. Derived keys are expressed as security tokens. The following URI is used to represent the token type:
http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-secureconversation/200512/dk
The derived key token does not support references using key identifiers or key names. All references MUST use an ID (to a wsu:Id attribute) or a URI reference to the <wsc:Identifier> element in the SCT.

7.1 Syntax

The following illustrates the syntax for <wsc:DerivedKeyToken>:
<wsc:DerivedKeyToken wsu:Id="." Algorithm="." xmlns:wsc="." xmlns:wsse="." xmlns:wsu="."> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>.</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsc:Properties>.</wsc:Properties> <wsc:Generation>.</wsc:Generation> <wsc:Offset>.</wsc:Offset> <wsc:Length>.</wsc:Length> <wsc:Label>.</wsc:Label> <wsc:Nonce>.</wsc:Nonce> </wsc:DerivedKeyToken>

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Consequently, the following two illustrations are functionally equivalent:
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsc="." xmlns:wsse="." xmlns:xx="." xmlns:ds="." xmlns:wsu="."> <xx:MyToken wsu:Id="base">.</xx:MyToken> <wsc:DerivedKeyToken wsu:Id="newKey"> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsse:Reference URI="#base"/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsc:Nonce>.</wsc:Nonce> </wsc:DerivedKeyToken> <ds:Signature>. <ds:KeyInfo> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference> <wsse:Reference URI="#newKey"/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> </ds:KeyInfo> </ds:Signature> </wsse:Security>
This is functionally equivalent to the following:
<wsse:Security xmlns:wsc="." xmlns:wsse="." xmlns:xx="." xmlns:ds="." xmlns:wsu="."> <xx:MyToken wsu:Id="base">.</xx:MyToken> <ds:Signature>. <ds:KeyInfo> <wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsc:Nonce="."> <wsse:Reference URI="#base"/> </wsse:SecurityTokenReference> </ds:KeyInfo> </ds:Signature> </wsse:Security>
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8 Associating a Security Context
For a variety of reasons it may be necessary to reference a Security Context Token. These references can be broken into two general categories: references from within the <wsse:Security> element, generally used to indicate the key used in a signature or encryption operation and references from other parts of the SOAP envelope, for example to specify a token to be used in some particular way. References within the <wsse:Security> element can further be divided into reference to an SCT found within the message and references to a SCT not present in the message. The Security Context Token does not support references to it using key identifiers or key names. All references MUST either use an ID (to a wsu:Id attribute) or a <wsse:Reference> to the <wsc:Identifier> element. References using an ID are message-specific. References using the <wsc:Identifier> element value are message independent. If the SCT is referenced from within the <wsse:Security> element or from an RST or RSTR, it is RECOMMENDED that these references be message independent, but these references MAY be message-specific. A reference from the RST/RSTR is treated differently than other references from the SOAP Body as the RST/RSTR is exclusively dealing with security related information similar to the <wsse:Security> element. When an SCT located in the <wsse:Security> element is referenced from outside the <wsse:Security> element, a message independent referencing mechanisms MUST be used, to enable a cleanly layered processing model unless there is a prior agreement between the involved parties to use message-specific referencing mechanism. When an SCT is referenced from within the <wsse:Security> element, but the SCT is not present in the message, (presumably because it was transmitted in a previous message) a message independent referencing mechanism MUST be used. The following example illustrates associating a specific security context with an action.

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A. Sample Usages
This non-normative appendix illustrates several sample usage patterns of [WS-Trust] and this document. Specifically, it illustrates different patterns that could be used to parallel, at an end-to-end message level, the selected TLS/SSL scenarios. This is not intended to be the definitive method for the scenarios, nor is it fully inclusive. Its purpose is simply to illustrate, in a context familiar to readers, how this specification might be used. The following sections are based on a scenario where the client wishes to authenticate the server prior to sharing any of its own credentials. It should be noted that the following sample usages are illustrative; any implementation of the examples illustrated below should be carefully reviewed for potential security attacks. For example, multi-leg exchanges such as those below should be careful to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks or downgrade attacks. It may be desirable to use running hashes as challenges that are signed or a similar mechanism to ensure continuity of the exchange. The examples below assume that both parties understand the appropriate security policies in use and can correctly construct signatures and encryption that the other party can process.

A.1 Anonymous SCT

In this scenario the requestor wishes to remain anonymous while authenticating the recipient and establishing an SCT for secure communication. This scenario assumes that the requestor has a key for the recipient. If this isn't the case, they can use [WS-MEX] or the mechanisms described in a later section or obtain one from another security token service. There are two basic patterns that can apply, which only vary slightly. The first is as follows: 1. The requestor sends an RST to the recipient requesting an SCT. The request contains key material encrypted for the recipient. The request is not authenticated. 2. The recipient, if it accepts such requests, returns an RSTRC with one or more RSTRs with the SCT as the requested token and does not return any proof information indicating that the requestor's key is the proof. A slight variation on this is as follows: 1. The requestor sends an RST to the recipient requesting an SCT. The request contains key material encrypted for the recipient. The request is not authenticated. 2. The recipient, if it accepts such requests, returns an RSTRC with one or more RSTR and with the SCT as the requested token and returns its own key material encrypted using the requestor's key. Another slight variation is to return a new key encrypted using the requestor's provided key. It should be noted that the variations that involve encrypting data using the requestor's key material might be subject to certain types of key attacks. Yet another approach is to establish a secure channel (e.g. TLS/SSL IP/Sec) between the requestor and the recipient. Key material can then safely flow in either direction. In some circumstances, this provides greater protection than the approach above when returning key information to the requestor.

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Birgit Pfitzmann, IBM Fumiko Satoh, IBM Keith Stobie, Microsoft T.R. Vishwanath, Microsoft Richard Ward, Microsoft Hervey Wilson, Microsoft TC Members during the development of this specification: Don Adams, Tibco Software Inc. Jan Alexander, Microsoft Corporation Steve Anderson, BMC Software Donal Arundel, IONA Technologies Howard Bae, Oracle Corporation Abbie Barbir, Nortel Networks Limited Charlton Barreto, Adobe Systems Mighael Botha, Software AG, Inc. Toufic Boubez, Layer 7 Technologies Inc. Norman Brickman, Mitre Corporation Melissa Brumfield, Booz Allen Hamilton Lloyd Burch, Novell Scott Cantor, Internet2 Greg Carpenter, Microsoft Corporation Steve Carter, Novell Ching-Yun (C.Y.) Chao, IBM Martin Chapman, Oracle Corporation Kate Cherry, Lockheed Martin Henry (Hyenvui) Chung, IBM Luc Clement, Systinet Corp. Paul Cotton, Microsoft Corporation Glen Daniels, Sonic Software Corp. Peter Davis, Neustar, Inc. Martijn de Boer, SAP AG Werner Dittmann, Siemens AG Abdeslem DJAOUI, CCLRC-Rutherford Appleton Laboratory Fred Dushin, IONA Technologies Petr Dvorak, Systinet Corp. Colleen Evans, Microsoft Corporation Ruchith Fernando, WSO2 Mark Fussell, Microsoft Corporation Vijay Gajjala, Microsoft Corporation Marc Goodner, Microsoft Corporation Hans Granqvist, VeriSign Martin Gudgin, Microsoft Corporation Tony Gullotta, SOA Software Inc. Jiandong Guo, Sun Microsystems
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Phillip Hallam-Baker, VeriSign Patrick Harding, Ping Identity Corporation Heather Hinton, IBM Frederick Hirsch, Nokia Corporation Jeff Hodges, Neustar, Inc. Will Hopkins, BEA Systems, Inc. Alex Hristov, Otecia Incorporated John Hughes, PA Consulting Diane Jordan, IBM Venugopal K, Sun Microsystems Chris Kaler, Microsoft Corporation Dana Kaufman, Forum Systems, Inc. Paul Knight, Nortel Networks Limited Ramanathan Krishnamurthy, IONA Technologies Christopher Kurt, Microsoft Corporation Kelvin Lawrence, IBM Hubert Le Van Gong, Sun Microsystems Jong Lee, BEA Systems, Inc. Rich Levinson, Oracle Corporation Tommy Lindberg, Dajeil Ltd. Mark Little, JBoss Inc. Hal Lockhart, BEA Systems, Inc. Mike Lyons, Layer 7 Technologies Inc. Eve Maler, Sun Microsystems Ashok Malhotra, Oracle Corporation Anand Mani, CrimsonLogic Pte Ltd Jonathan Marsh, Microsoft Corporation Robin Martherus, Oracle Corporation Miko Matsumura, Infravio, Inc. Gary McAfee, IBM Michael McIntosh, IBM John Merrells, Sxip Networks SRL Jeff Mischkinsky, Oracle Corporation Prateek Mishra, Oracle Corporation Bob Morgan, Internet2 Vamsi Motukuru, Oracle Corporation Raajmohan Na, EDS Anthony Nadalin, IBM Andrew Nash, Reactivity, Inc. Eric Newcomer, IONA Technologies Duane Nickull, Adobe Systems Toshihiro Nishimura, Fujitsu Limited